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Abstract
There are several research papers regarding the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance. One of the aspects of corporate governance is the
board of directors. Board monitoring is a critical aspect which can be measured by
number of board meetings and number of board committees. There are several studies
on board diversity and composition of board of directors and firm performance, while
there are few research studies on the number of board committees and board meetings
and their relationship with the firm performance. Accordingly, this thesis focuses on
the relationship between board monitoring measured by number of board meetings and
number of board committees and firm performance in the UK. The sample is Financial
Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) 150 which includes the largest 150 listed
companies on London Stock Exchange. Firm performance is measured by an
accounting measure which is return on assets (ROA) and a market performance
measure which is Tobin’s Q. The results of this study show that there is no significant
relationship between number of board meetings and firm performance. However, there
is a significant negative relationship between number of board committees and firm
performance.
Keywords: board committees, board meetings, corporate governance, firm
performance, FTSE150, UK.
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1.Introduction
Corporate governance is an essential component that controls companies’
operations. It sets specific guidelines for management to make sure that stakeholders’
rights are maintained. There are several definitions of corporate governance. One of
these definitions stated by Zingales (1998: 4) is that corporate governance means the
“allocation of ownership, capital structure, managerial incentive schemes, takeovers,
board of directors, pressure from institutional investors, product market competition,
labour market competition, organizational structure, etc., can all be thought of as
institutions that affect the process through which quasi-rents are distributed”. Shleifer
and Vishny (1997: 4) stated that corporate governance is “the ways in which suppliers
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.
Srivastava, Das and Pattanayak (2018: 2) defined corporate governance as “a set of
predefined rules which guide the actions of managers resulting in the best interest of
investors”. This thesis focuses on the definition illustrated by Srivastava, Das and
Pattanayak (2018) since it is the most relevant one to this study.
The theory which is pertinent to this thesis is the agency theory. Bendickson,
Muldoon, Liguori and Davis (2016) argued that agency theory is applied to various
disciplines. Agency theory deals with the relationship between principal and agent. The
principal has certain goals to be achieved and the agent has responsibilities that should
be performed. If the actions of the agent are not aligned with the interests of the
principals, this will lead to conflict of interest between them. According to the agency
theory, the agents are the management of the company while the principals are the
shareholders of the company. The goal of the shareholders is to maximize their wealth
to increase firm performance. The agents work on behalf of the firm which has the
money of the shareholders. Sometimes, there is conflict of interest that occurs between
the shareholders and management of the company. Accordingly, governance is needed
to resolve this agency problem. The board of directors is one of the solutions for this
issue as they oversee the actions of the management to help them work in the best
interest of the shareholders.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), six principles of corporate governance are addressed. The first principle deals
with the transparency and the fairness of the market. The second principle illustrates
the rights of the shareholders and the fairness in their treatment. Stock markets,
institutional investors and other intermediaries are the focus of the third principle. The
4

fourth principle interprets stakeholders’ roles. The fifth principle is about transparency
and disclosure, while the sixth principle is the roles and responsibilities of the board of
directors (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015)
This thesis focuses on the last principle of corporate governance which is the
roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and their relationship with firm
performance. It examines the effect of board monitoring on the firm performance in
UK. This thesis will contribute to the literature since there are few research studies
about the number of board committees, which is one of the independent variables, and
their effect on firm performance. This thesis is divided into five sections: introduction,
the literature review, the research methodology, the results, and the conclusion.
2.Literature review
2.1 Board functions and its effectiveness
An essential aspect for board of directors is their effectiveness. Masli, Sherwood
and Srivastava (2018) argue that certain aspects should be taken into consideration to
ensure the effectiveness of the board. The first aspect deals with the independence of
board members. They found that the higher the number of independent board members,
the better the effectiveness of the board. That is due to their ability to strive for
achieving the goal of the shareholders which is maximizing their wealth. There are also
laws that enhance this independence aspect. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley act
(SOX) in the section 301, requires that all members in audit committee should be
independent. It was also required by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (Nasdaq) (Masli, Sherwood
and Srivastava, 2018). NYSE is a large stock exchange based in New York (NYSE,
2018). Nasdaq is also located in New York and is the largest electronic stock exchange
in the world (The Nasdaq story, 2018). There should be more independent board
members especially in the compensation and nomination committees. Nomination and
compensation committees should have all their members independent. Accordingly,
after the issuance of SOX, firms are more likely to have more independent members
than before. They also prefer not to have the chief executive officer (CEO) and the
chairman of the company to be the same person. The activity of board members is the
second aspect which is measured by the frequency of board meetings and the attitude
of the board members themselves such as how they prepare for the meetings, their
attendance, participation and follow up. Regulators believe that the board effectiveness
5

increases as the board activity increases. The third characteristic is about the
competence of the board members, it illustrates that as the competency of board
members such as their expertise and their knowledge about the firm processes and its
industry increase, their ability to monitor and guide the management will improve. The
behavioral attributes of board members are the last feature, it deals with their
capabilities to work as one team, reach effective solutions and encourage good
relationships among the board members (Masli, Sherwood and Srivastava, 2018). This
thesis focuses on the second aspect of board effectiveness which is the activity of the
board members. It will be measured by number of board meetings and number of board
committees.

2.2 Board of directors and firm performance
Various aspects about board of directors were examined by previous research
such as: board size, board composition and board monitoring. Bachiller, Giorgino and
Paternostro (2014) argue that several studies illustrate the relationship between the
structure of the board of directors and firm performance. These studies usually focus
on two aspects which are the board size and the composition. Regarding the size, they
concluded that board size and company performance are negatively correlated. This
negative relationship is due to the concept of ‘free-riders’. Because of the increase in
board size, not all members will participate in the decision-making process.
Accordingly, some of them will take the role of free-riders and this will negatively
impact firm performance. Other studies argue that there is no relationship between
board size and firm performance (Beiner, Dorbetz, Schmid and Zimmermann, 2004),
while some studies suggested that board size depends on the type of organization. These
studies support that there is a positive relationship between the board size and firm
performance (represented by Tobin’s Q) in complex entities. These entities are high
debt and diversified entities (entities have various businesses or products that are not
related). Diversified companies need higher level of board monitoring than other types
of companies since they have different business segments that require diverse
backgrounds. This can be achieved by having a large board size including several
outsiders that have distinct backgrounds. On the other hand, since high debt firms need
more advice to secure external resources such as debt, they also require a large board
size (Coles, Daniel, Naveen, 2004).
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Rashid, Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin (2010) stated that composition deals with the
presence of outside board members. They examined this relationship in Bangladesh
using 274 observations. They concluded that there is no relationship between the board
composition (represented in terms of the presence of independent outside directors) and
firm performance. A negative relationship between board size and firm performance
(measured by ROA) was also concluded. These results are due to “information
asymmetries between outside independent and other directors. Therefore, it is
supportive that outside independent directors of Bangladeshi firms are not able to
ensure the checks and balances of accountability and management activities” (Rashid,
Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin, 2010: 89). This aspect is quite debatable because several
studies argue that there is a strong relationship between board composition and the firm
performance and others argue that there is no relationship at all. These variances may
be due to external factors such as: corporate law, capital markets law, life cycle of the
company or different strategies of the companies. However, results are not consistent,
the firm performance might be affected indirectly by the board based on the quality of
monitoring. (Dezoysa, Lodh and Rukin, 2010).
Ebenezer (2017), conducted a study using 137 companies in Nigeria and Ghana
from 2008 to 2014, to check the relationship between board monitoring and firm
performance. It was concluded that there is a positive relationship between the intensity
of board monitoring and firm performance. “Intense monitoring enables directors to be
informed and better understanding of important developments within the firm, and
better position to timely take decisions to address emerging critical problems and
improve performance” (Ebenzer, 2017: 36).
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) extended previous studies performed by Vafeas
(1999) and Adams (2005) and conducted it on a larger sample covering the period from
1999 to 2005 on companies in the United States of America. They examined the
relationship between board monitoring and firm performance by using the logarithm of
board meetings and the logarithm of the product of annual board meetings and number
of independent board members as the measure for board monitoring activity. They also
added corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions in their study. Moreover, they
took into consideration the independence of board members, duality of the CEO (when
the chair and the CEO are the same), external factors that could pressure the firm to
increase board monitoring activity. They concluded that board monitoring is positively
7

affecting the firm value (represented by Tobin’s Q). Their study also concludes that
board monitoring does not improve ROA, so the key role of the board is to improve the
investment opportunities not the current performance of the firm. The positive results
between board monitoring and Tobin’s Q are because as the board monitoring intensity
increases, the board will provide more vital advice which will consequently help the
management of the firm to boost the firm’s investment opportunities and finally
increase the firm value. Their results also confirm that there is no relationship between
firm performance and increasing independence of board members. The effects of the
regulations for the board monitoring depend on the situation. If the board monitoring
increased to comply with the rules only, in order not to get into trouble, this will
negatively affect the performance of the firm because the management will concentrate
on following the rules and will become unfocused on the main goal of the company
which is maximizing the shareholders’ wealth (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010).
The variables that are examined in this thesis as measures of board monitoring
are: number of board meetings and number of board committees. On the other hand,
number of independent board members and board size are among the control variables
that are related to board monitoring. Literature review about these variables is discussed
in the following sub-section of the thesis.

2.2.1 Number of board meetings and firm performance
One of the variables that this thesis focuses on is the frequency of board
meetings. This thesis aims to examine the relationship between number of board
meetings and firm performance. According to a study that was conducted using data
from Amman Stock exchange from 2009 to 2013, frequent board meetings lead to
identifying more issues and collaborative engagement, producing good decisions and
accordingly enhancing the performance of the firm (Al-Daoud, Saidin, Abidin, 2016).
Another study was conducted to test the same variable for deposit money banks in
Nigeria. The study uses Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable representing firm
performance and number of board meetings as the independent variable and they used
two control variables: firm size and board size. They argue that there is a positive
relationship between the number of board meetings and firm performance. The ability
of board monitoring is getting better, when they meet more frequently and consequently
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enhances the firm performance and maximizing shareholders’ wealth (Eluyela,
Akintimehin, okere, Ozordi, Osuma, Ilogho and Oladipo, 2018).
Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015), conducted a study on 700 listed Malaysian
companies which includes financial and non-financial companies in 2009. It was
concluded that there is a negative relationship between number of board meetings and
firm performance (ROA). Frequent board meetings direct resources towards activities
that are not fully productive.
Kaur and Vij (2017) studied the relationship between board characteristics and
firm performance. They conducted this study using banks in India for the years between
2008 and 2014. They concluded that the number of board meetings, has a positive effect
since the increase in the board meetings will enable the board members to exchange
more ideas and the management will be more proactive and consequently decision
making will be improved.
Another aspect related to board meetings is the attendance of the board of
directors. The study concluded that if board of directors attend the meetings by
themselves this affects the performance of the firm positively. On the other hand, if
they authorize representatives to attend the meeting on their behalf, this would have an
insignificant negative impact on the firm performance. The board members tend to
attend the board meetings by themselves when they have higher qualifications which
consequently affects firm performance positively (Chou, Chung and Yin, 2013).
Another study was conducted to measure the relationship between the number
of board meetings and corporate value in South Africa on a sample of 169 listed
companies covering the period from 2002 to 2007. It was concluded that high frequency
of board meetings leads to high corporate performance. This happens because when the
number of board meetings increases, board members can monitor and advise more
effectively and consequently improve firm performance (Ntim and Osei, 2011).
Arora and Sharma (2016) studied the relationship between corporate
governance and firm performance in India covering the period from 2001 to 2010. The
study reveals that there is a positive relationship between the frequency of board
meetings and firm performance. Monitoring will be better by meeting more frequently
because board members will have more time to debate and discuss more issues.
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2.2.2 Number of board committees and firm performance
There is also a relationship between the board committees and firm
performance. Most of the research focuses on the relationship between each committee
and firm performance but there is little research about the relationship between the
number of committees and firm performance. Lam and Lee (2012) conducted a study
in Hong Kong for the period between 2001 to 2003 including 346 companies to check
the relationship between board committees and firm performance. There is a positive
relationship between nomination committee and firm performance, while there is a
negative relationship between remuneration committee and firm performance. The
positive relationship related to the nomination committee is due to higher independence
of the board members in this committee. The presence of independent board members
will help the company to achieve good corporate governance practices which will
consequently enhance firm performance. They also have found that the ownership
structure affects the results. The family ownership affects the relationship between
board committees and firm performance negatively in Hong Kong since board
committees in family businesses usually have family members or directors who are
executives. The negative relationship related to remuneration committees is because
“the monitoring function of remuneration committees would be weakened with the
involvement of executive chairman who is usually from or related to the controlling
family” (Lam and Lee, 2012: 363). In addition to that, remuneration committee has less
independent members than nomination committee (Lam and Lee, 2012).
Hoque, Islam and Azam (2013) conducted a study to check if there is a
relationship between the frequency of meeting of the board committees and the firm
performance. They conducted their research on 118 Australian listed companies
covering the period from 1999 to 2007. It was proved that some of the committees have
effects on the firm performance while others do not. Firm performance, which is
measured by ROA and return on equity (ROE), is affected by the frequency of meetings
of the audit committee and remuneration committee but risk committee does not
influence firm performance. The positive effect of the audit committee meetings is due
to that this committee enhances performance of the companies by controlling financial
risks through enhancing financial reporting. On the other hand, the positive results
related to the remuneration committees is due to enhancing performance of the firm
through increasing productivity because of securing higher compensations to managers.
10

In addition to that, they illustrated that there are factors that affect the frequency of
board committee meetings. Board members are concerned about the firm performance
since this would affect their reputation or committed and actively attend the board
committee meetings or have chairman who is eager and requires frequent board
committee meetings.

2.2.3 Number of independent board members and firm performance
Another aspect that affects firm performance is the number of independent
board members. Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2013) conducted a study on 307 small
and medium sized companies in Spain. They concluded a negative relationship between
number of independent board members and firm performance. They stated that inside
directors contribute to better decisions because of their knowledge about the company’s
processes affecting firm performance positively. Singla and Singh (2019) conducted a
study for the period from 2007 to 2016 in India. They used a sample of 3,854 firms to
test the relationship between board monitoring and firm performance in India. They
represented board monitoring by board independence and the independence of audit
committee. They concluded that as the board independence increases, firm value (which
is represented by Tobin’s Q) decreases. Independence of board of directors may be
affected by the following factors: “adverse selection process (such as the involvement
of the CEO/promoters in the selection process); subtle linkages between the
independent directors and the CEO or the company which are too subtle to come under
the purview of the formal definition of an independent director; long tenure of the
independent directors in the firms” (Singla and Singh, 2019: 8). Other factors that may
contribute to this negative relationship are: sometimes they do not have enough
experience about the business of the company, they are busy, and they do not have
enough incentives. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between
independence of audit committee and firm value. Their findings were aligned with
Klein’s results (1998) since the independent directors are valuable when they are placed
in the right committees (Singla and Singh, 2019). Rashid (2018) conducted a study to
demonstrate the relationship between board independence and firm performance in
Bangladesh using 135 companies. Although, it is known that the presence of
independent members is better to boost shareholders’ goals, it was found that there is
no positive relationship between board independence and firm performance in
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Bangladesh. The study stated that insiders are better because they have more valuable
knowledge about the firm than the outside directors. In addition to that, there may be a
relationship between the new outsiders who are recommended by insiders. In some
cases, outsiders are not qualified enough because they do not have enough information
about the firm as insiders have and most of them are not full-timers. Yasser, Mamun
and Marcus (2017) conducted a study on companies in Pakistan listed on Karachi stock
exchange to validate the relationship between board structure and firm performance.
The study represented firm performance indicator by ROA, ROE and economic value
added. It was concluded that there is a negative relation between independent board
members and firm performance. This negative relationship may occur because there are
no requirements that the independent director should have suitable qualifications and
experience.
Ghasemi and Ab Razak (2016) have conducted a study in Malaysia from 2010
to 2013 using 267 listed companies to test the relationship between executive ratio and
profitability of the firm. Executive ratio is “the ratio of the executive directors to total
members on the board” (Ghasemi and Ab Razak, 2016: 3). In Malaysia, companies are
motivated to have more independent board members, however, it was concluded that
there was a positive relationship between number of executive and earning per share
because they have knowledge and experience about the business processes of the firm
(Ghasemi and Ab Razak, 2016).
There is another study which was conducted to test the relationship between
independence of board of directors with the firm performance in Saudi Arabia. They
used a sample of 329 non-financial listed firms for the years from 2013 to 2015
(Alshetwi, 2017). It was concluded that there is no relationship between independence
and firm performance. They suggested that this relationship may be applicable in Saudi
Arabia because “Saudi Arabia’s structure is influenced by societal norms that are
heavily influenced by the tribal system and tribal values” (Alshetwi, 2017: 12). Then
they did further tests that revealed that board independence may affect firm
performance negatively in Saudi Arabia. This is because “in Saudi business context,
non-executive members lack real independence from management and represent an
additional cost burden that outweighs any benefits obtained from them” (Alshetwi,
2017:12). Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015), concluded that there is no relationship
between board independence and firm performance.
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Ammari, Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze (2016) tested the French market by
conducting a study from 2001 to 2013 using a sample of 80 listed companies. They
used the two measures for dependent variables which are ROA (as an accounting
measure for firm performance) and Tobin’s Q (as a market measure for firm
performance). They used interaction terms for board monitoring variables. These terms
are: a monitoring committee indicator with board size and a monitoring committee
indicator with board independence. The monitoring committee indicator takes the value
of zero or one. It takes one if the number of monitoring committees are at least three. It
was concluded that there is a negative relationship between independent board members
and accounting performance if there are at least three committees. This negative impact
on accounting performance is due to “the high costs incurred by the ﬁrm in the case of
several committees adding to the independent directors’ costs” (Ammari, Amdouni,
Zemzem and Ellouze, 2016: 10).
There is another study that checks the relationship between board independence
and firm performance. They used non-financial listed companies on FTSE 100 for the
period from 2012 to 2015. The researchers concluded that there was a positive
relationship between board independence and firm performance (represented by
Tobin’s Q) due to the mitigation of the agency theory conflicts because of the presence
of more independent board members and consequently firm performance will improve
(Alqatan, Chbib, Hussainey, 2019). Kaur and Vij (2017) concluded that having many
independent members has no effect on efficient board. However, banks need to have
independent members that have enough knowledge and skills to be able to help the
executives to run the company well.
Arora (2012) examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance. This study was conducted in India covering the period between 2001 and
2010. It was concluded that the firm performance was enhanced when there are many
inside directors on the board. “This relationship can also be attributed to the fact that
the concept of board independence is a new phenomenon for Indian firms and so, it
might take few more years to have a momentous impact on firm performance.” (Arora,
2012: 547).
Alhussayen and Shabou (2016) conducted a study to examine the relationship
between board monitoring and firm performance in Saudi Arabia between 2008 to
13

2013. The sample contains the listed companies on stock exchange in Saudi Arabia
(excluding firms related to banking and insurance sectors). Firm value was represented
by Tobin’s Q and Market to book ratio (M-B ratio) and the board monitoring was
represented by the board committees’ independence. These committees are
remuneration, nomination and audit committees. M-B ratio is calculated by dividing
the market value of common stock by the book value of common stocks. They
concluded that there is a positive relationship between board monitoring and firm value.
They stated that these results show that board of directors is effective in Saudi Arabia
in terms of their monitoring functions. They also suggested that monitoring provided
by outside directors is better than monitoring provided by inside directors as “the
outside board members provide the required monitoring over the firm's managers and
controlling shareholders and prevent them from misusing the firm's resources”
(Alhussayen and Shabou, 2016: 149)
Klein (1998) examined whether there is a relationship between board committee
structure and firm performance by using a sample of S&P 500 companies. Klein found
that if the board composition was illustrated by dividing the board members into
insiders (currently employed by the firm), outsiders and affiliates (they can be relatives
of the CEO, were employed by the firm but they are no longer employees of the firm,
they have business relationship with the company), there will be no relationship
between the firm performance and board composition. On the other hand, “Board
composition has marginal explanatory value for various performance measure” (Klein,
1998: 300). The study examines the roles of the board members on different board
committees. It was found that there is a positive relationship between the existence of
many insiders in the investment and finance committee and firm performance. It was
also proved that a company experiences abnormal stock returns if they increased the
number of inside board members on their finance and investment committees. The
positive results associated with the presence of insiders are due to their valuable
knowledge about the business activities (Klein, 1998).
Arora and Sharma (2016) concluded that independence of board of directors
affect firm performance negatively. This negative relationship may be because board
independence is unfamiliar concept in developing countries, accordingly it will take
time to positively influence firm performance.

14

2.2.4 Board size and firm performance
Board size affects firm performance. Ghasemi and Ab Razak (2016) proved that
there is a positive relationship between the board size and firm profitability because the
large board size gives more strategic information and increases business connections.
Alshetwi (2017) concluded that there is no relationship between board size and firm
performance of non-financial firms in Saudi. Kalsie and Shrivastav (2016) conducted a
study that measures the relationship between board size and firm performance in India.
They used a sample 145 companies covering the period from 2008 to 2012. They used
ROA, Tobin’s Q, Market to book value ratio (MBVR) and return on capital employed
(ROCE) as measures for firm performance. They concluded that there is a positive
relationship between board size and firm performance. They believed that the positive
results of this study support agency theory and resource dependency theory. These
theories will be discussed later.
Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) concluded that the larger board size can better
monitor the management and consequently enhance firm performance. Ammari,
Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze (2016) tested the French market and concluded that
there is a negative relationship between large board size and market performance. When
the board size increases, decisions are not appropriately made because of the
coordination problems they face which consequently affects performance. However,
there is a positive relationship between board size and accounting performance if there
are at least three committees. The presence of the committees helps the large board size
to achieve its goals, since the key role of these committees is to solve coordination
issues and make sure that all members receive the same information (asymmetric
information). Alqatan, Chbib, Hussainey (2019) concluded there is a positive
relationship between board size and firm performance when using ROA as a measure
of firm performance. The large board size leads to better decision making due to more
ideas will be generated which will finally enhance firm performance.
Kaur and Vij (2017) concluded that there is a positive relationship between
small board size and firm performance. Board size has a negative relationship with firm
performance due to the difficulty the board face for organization, communication and
making decisions when they have large board size which ultimately affects firm
performance.
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Arora (2012) showed that there is a positive relationship between board size and
firm performance if they used Tobin’s Q as measure of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is
enhanced by having large board size, since the firm will have more qualifications and
experience which will enhance decision making. However, there is a negative relation
between them when Arora used ROA as firm performance indicator. Arora justified
that this negative relationship, which is different from other studies’ findings, may be
because this study is conducted specifically for pharmaceutical industry. It was also
proved that there is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and firm
performance by using both measures ROA and Tobin’s Q. The positive results
associated with large board size and increase in the number of meetings are due to
collective experience and knowledge which lead to better decision making and
improved firm performance.
There was a study conducted in Pakistan to test the relationship between
corporate governance and firm performance. The period covered was from 2010 to
2014 using 80 non-financial firms in Pakistan. They concluded that there is a positive
relationship between board size and firm performance. They believed that these results
are aligned with the resource dependence theory. (Muhammad, Rehman, Waqas, 2016).
Yasser, Mamun and Marcus (2017) concluded there was a positive relationship
between board size and firm performance because as the board size increases,
monitoring activity increases, because of the various experiences of the board members
which will consequently enhances the firm performance.
Arora and Sharma (2016) concluded that there is a negative relationship
between board size and ROA. They believed that this negative relationship is due to the
difficulty in communication, coordination and the free riding issues associated with the
increase in the number of board of directors.

2.3 Theories
There are numerous theories that deal with the relationship between board of
directors and firm performance. These theories are agency theory, resource dependency
theory and stewardship theory. As previously mentioned agency theory interprets the
relationship between principal and agent. This theory states that large board size is
better for firm performance because board of directors will work towards the interests
16

of the shareholders and consequently enhance firm performance. Resource dependency
theory deals with the behavior change of the organization to utilize external resources.
This theory stated that larger board size is better since more experience in different
fields will be available for the firm and consequently enhance its performance. On the
other hand, another theory that favors small board size is the stewardship theory (Kalsie
and Shrivastav, 2016). “The stewardship theory documents that the managers, when
left on their own, act as responsible stewards of the assets they control” (Kalsie and
Shrivastav, 2016: 149). This theory supports that the managers do not need to be
monitored by large board size and a small board is enough to monitor their performance
(Kalsie and Shrivastav, 2016). Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and Ramli (2017) stated that
according to previous research, two theories are related to the relationship between
board of directors and firm performance which are the agency theory and resource
dependency theory. Agency theory states that the key role of the board of directors is to
monitor the management and to mitigate the conflicts between the management of the
company and the shareholders because of their different interests. On the other hand,
resource dependency theory suggests that the board of directors are considered as
resources for the firm. They could improve its performance through providing the firm
with expertise, maintain good external relationships and give advice to the management
of the company. Agency theory suggests that there is a positive relationship between
independent board of directors and firm performance since they will monitor the
management without prejudice and provide the firm with their expertise in different
areas. In terms of board size, agency theory states that there is a negative relationship
between board size and firm performance. Smaller size is better because as board size
increases, difficulty in decision making process will also increases because of the
complexity to make large board size agree on the same decision (Makhlouf, Laili, Basah
and Ramli, 2017).There is conflict between the findings of Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and
Ramli’s and Kalsie and Shrivastav’s research regarding the agency theory and its
relation with board size. Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and Ramli (2017) states that resource
dependency theory supports a positive relationship between board size and firm
performance since the presence of large board size from various backgrounds enhances
decision making and consequently improves firm performance. Regarding frequency
of board meetings, agency theory states that increasing the number of board meetings
is better, since monitoring will improve which enhances the firm performance. On the
other hand, stewardship theory suggests that the relationship between number of board
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meetings and firm performance may be negative because “the board of directors’
meetings are irrelevant to the implementation of a board’s governance obligations
because monitoring is an entirely endogenous process” (Makhlouf, Laili, Basah and
Ramli, 2017: 25).

2.4 Summary of the literature review
Appendix 1 summarizes the studies that were covered in the previous
literature review section. These studies focus on measuring the relationship between
board monitoring and firm performance.
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample size and data
This thesis measures the relationship between board monitoring (independent
variable) and firm performance (dependent variable). The sample size is based on the
Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) top 150 listed companies for the
period from 2013 to 2017. FTSE includes the largest listed companies on London Stock
Exchange (LSE). It manages Exchange traded funds (ETF), bonds, derivatives and
international equity (London Stock Exchange Group, 2018). The most popular index is
FTSE 100. However, there are also FTSE 150 and FTSE 250. This thesis focuses on
FTSE 150 which includes the largest 150 listed companies on LSE (FTSE, 2018). FTSE
150 is used in this thesis based on the availability of governance data related to board
members. FTSE index was designed to signify the performance of companies in the
UK which helps investors to comprehend the performance of the UK equity market
(FTSE Statistics, 2018).
The board data is from Spencer and Stuart which is a big consulting firm that
has 60 years of experience. It provides insights about how to select, evaluate and
increase the effectiveness of executives. It focuses on providing information about key
elements of boards which play an essential role in corporate governance trends. It
formulates a board index which explores the trends and the challenges facing boards in
various corporations. Examples of the most recent board index reports were: 2018 US
Spencer Stuart board index, 2018 Spain Spencer Stuart board index and 2018 France
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Spencer Stuart Board Index (Board Governance Trends: A Global View, 2018). The
financial data is from Thomson Reuters database and the audit type data is from S&P
Capital IQ database.

3.2 Model
The dependent variable is the firm performance which is measured by Tobin’s
Q (Total market value of the firm divided by total asset value of the firm) and return on
assets (ROA)1. This thesis uses ROA as an accounting measure and Tobin’s Q as market
performance measure. Tobin’s Q gives indication about the market value of the firm.
The independent variables are the number of board meetings and number of board
committees. Control variables are: number of independent board members, board size,
company size, leverage, sector/industry and audit type. R software is used in the
analysis.
Accordingly, this thesis focuses on testing two models. The first model includes
the first dependent variable (ROA) with all independent and control variables. The
second model includes the second dependent variable (Tobin’s Q) with all independent
and control variables. The below equations are used to examine the two models:
𝑌

=𝛽 +𝛽 𝑋 +𝛽 𝑋 +𝛽 : 𝑋

:

+𝜀

𝑌

=𝛽 +𝛽 𝑋 +𝛽 𝑋 +𝛽 : 𝑋

:

+𝜀

Where:
𝑌

= ROA (Net income/Average total assets)

𝑌

= Tobin’s Q (Total market value of firm/Total asset value of firm)

𝑋

:

= Independent variables (discussed in Table 1)

𝑋

:

= Control variables (discussed in Table 1)

𝛽 = Intercept.
𝛽 : = Regression model coefficients.
𝜀 = Error term.

1

ROE was tested but the results were insignificant.
19

Table 1: Definition of independent variables
Category X

Variable

Variable

Calculation

Source

N/A

Spencer

name
Board

𝑋

variable

𝑋

Control

𝑋

Variable

Number of

nmeeting

board

and

meetings

stuart

Number of

Nbcom

N/A

Spencer

board

and

committees

stuart

Number of

Nib

N/A

Spencer

independent

and

board

stuart

members
𝑋

Board size

Board size

N/A

Spencer
and
stuart

𝑋
𝑋

𝑋

Company size Employees
Leverage
Sector /

Leverage
Industry

Industry

Number of

Thomson

employees

Reuters

Total debt %

Thomson

/Common Equity

Reuters

1= financial

Thomson

services sector

Reuters

0=non-financial
services sector

𝑋

Audit type

Audit

1 = audited by one

S&P

of the Big- four

capital

0= not audited by

IQ

one of the Big -four

20

4. Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the data which shows the mean, standard
deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observation. The average value for ROA
is 9.645 with a maximum of 269.11 and a minimum of -21.58. The average value for
Tobin’s Q is 0.002 with a maximum of 0.071 and a minimum of 0.00001. The average
number of board meetings is 8 meetings with a minimum of 2 meetings and a maximum
of 23 meetings. In terms of board committees, they have average of approximately 4
committees. The maximum number is 7 committees while the minimum is 3
committees. The average number of independent board members is 6 with a maximum
of 15 and a minimum of 2. While the average board size is 10 members with a maximum
of 20 and minimum of 5. The average number of employees is 42,128 employees.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Statistic
ROA
Tobin’s Q
Nbmeeting
Nbcom
Nib
Board size
Employees

Mean
9.645
0.002
8.167
3.801
6.181
10.254
42,128

St. Dev.
22.296
0.005
2.498
0.866
2.021
2.317
83,990

Min
-21.580
0.00001
2
3
2
5
12

Max
269.11
0.071
23
7
15
20
631,465

N
698
734
744
745
745
745
738

4.2 Correlation
4.2.1 Pearson correlation
Table 3 shows Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for the sample. The correlation
matrix shows that there is a negative correlation between ROA and leverage and
number of board meetings. There is a significant negative correlation between ROA
and number of board committees, number of independent board members, board size
and number of employees. There is a negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and
number of board meetings, number of employees and leverage. There is a significant
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and number of board committees, number of
independent board members and board size. The correlation matrix also shows that
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there is a strong positive correlation between number of board committees and number
of board meetings, number of independent, board size and number of employees.
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficient matrix

nbmeeting

Pearson
Correlation

nbmeeting
1

nbcom

nib

Board
size

ROA

Tobin’s
Q

employees

leverage

Sig. (2tailed)
N
nbcom

nib

Pearson
Correlation

.177**

Sig. (2tailed)

0.000

N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

board_size

0.045

0.000

1

745

745

.312**

.83
1**

Sig. (2tailed)

0.254

0.000

0.0
00

744

745

745

745

-0.044

**

.12
6**
0.0
01

-.121**

Pearson
Correlation

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

0.245

-.157

0.000

1

1

0.001

697

698

698

698

698

-0.020

-.156**

.11
8**
0.0
01

-.110**

.959*

0.595

0.000

1

*

0.003

0.00
0

733

734

734

734

693

734

Pearson
Correlation

0.057

.213**

.26
1**

.187**

.093*

-0.070

Sig. (2tailed)

0.126

0.000

0.0
00

0.000

0.01
5

0.060

N
leverage

745
.399**

744

N

employees

744
.074*

0.042

Sig. (2tailed)
Tobin’s Q

1

Pearson
Correlation

N
ROA

744

1

728

728

728

728

685

721

728

Pearson
Correlation

0.042

-0.039

0.0
04

0.010

-0.026

0.004

Sig. (2tailed)

0.257

0.300

0.9
07

0.792

0.01
8
0.64
4

0.493

0.909

714

715

715

715

676

712

706

N

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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1

715

4.2.2 Chi-Square test
The two variables: audit and industry are categorical variables. Accordingly,
correlation test was carried out to examine them. The relevant test is the Chi-Square
test. Two hypotheses were formulated to be tested as shown in the below equations:
𝐻 = 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡
The Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction shows that x-squared
is 0.097654, the degrees of freedom equals to 1 and p-value equals to 0.7547. The
results show that as the p-value is greater than 0.05 so we cannot reject the null
hypothesis which means that audit and industry are independent.

4.3 Results of model 1
In the first model, the relationship between board monitoring and firm
performance (represented by ROA) was examined as shown in the below equation2:

𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑏𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑖𝑏
+ 𝛽 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
Where the definitions of the variables were provided in Table 1.
Firstly, the heterogeneity was examined to check if the selected sample has
some differences across the companies and time. Means are almost the same across
years as shown in Figure 1. However, ROA does not have equal means across different
companies. Few companies were different from the rest (almost all the companies have
the same average) as shown in Figure 2. Accordingly, these figures suggest the use of
panel data to incorporate the effects of different companies on the ROA.

2

There was no multicollinearity between variables.
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Figure 1. Heterogeneity across years in terms of ROA.

Figure 2. Heterogeneity across companies in terms of ROA.
Different models were examined to reach the best model. Time effect was
ignored in the first trial. On the other hand, companies’ effects were taken into
consideration as shown in Appendix 2. The results of the first trial shows that
companies are significant and have influence on ROA. The second trial was
incorporating time effect into the model. The time was insignificant (as shown in
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Appendix 3), so time can be ignored in the model. Another model was examined which
is OLS. It was used to ignore time and companies’ effect (refer to Appendix 4) showing
that the significant variables are number of board committees and leverage. The results
of the three trials show that time does not have an effect, however companies have
influence on ROA. Accordingly, fixed model was used to incorporate the companies as
factors to check for the individual fixed effects (companies’ effects) (as shown in
Appendix 5). F test also was carried out to check if fixed model or ordinary least squares
(OLS) was better (as shown in Appendix 6), and the conclusion was that fixed model
is better since the p-value was less than 0.05. Backward elimination method was used
to reach to the best model. Backward elimination is a process in which insignificant
variables will be removed gradually until the best model will be reached with the
significant variables. Accordingly, insignificant variables were removed gradually until
we reach the best model to measure the effect of the independent variables on ROA.
The first model that includes all the independent variables (before using the backward
elimination method) was as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Fixed model results with ROA
Unbalanced Panel: n = 180, T = 1-5, N = 681
Observations used in estimation: 180
Residuals:
Min.
-30.32926
Coefficients:
Intercept
Audit
board size
Industry
Leverage
Nbcom
Employees
Nib
nbmeeting

1st Qu.
-5.40913

Median
-0.75183

3rd Qu.
3.17023

Max.
234.92089

Esimate
34.7302771
3.0091357
-1.1867578
-1.8909339
-0.0261351
-3.4809019
0.0082303
0.7199976
-0.2955304

Std. Error
14.0002955
10.9208493
1.2963523
4.0937127
0.0083903
2.2503888
0.0075488
1.5532249
0.7341947

t-value
2.4807
0.2755
-0.9155
-0.4619
-3.1149
-1.5468
1.0903
0.4636
-0.4025

Pr(>|t|)
0.014080 *
0.783234
0.361240
0.644732
0.002158 **
0.123760
0.277126
0.643560
0.687802

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 68979
Residual Sum of Squares: 62810
R-Squared:
0.089422
Adj. R-Squared: 0.046822
F-statistic: 2.09911 on 8 and 171 DF, p-value: 0.038333
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P-value was less than 0.05 so the model is significant. In this model, leverage
was a significant variable. Also, there is a negative association between number of
board meetings and number of board committees with ROA. By applying the backward
elimination method to remove the insignificant variables and reach the best model. The
results were as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Fixed model results with ROA after applying backward elimination
Unbalanced Panel: n = 182, T = 1-5, N = 698
Observations used in estimation: 182
Residuals:
Min.
-31.91714
Coefficients:

1st Qu.
-5.55019

Median
-0.79087

3rd Qu.
2.71896

Estimate Std. Error
t-value
Intercept
33.277456 7.4572416
4.4624
1
Leverage
-0.025363 0.0080061
-3.1680
0
Nbcom
-4.316923 1.8398920
-2.3463
5
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 68982
Residual Sum of Squares: 63578
R-Squared:
0.07833
Adj. R-Squared: 0.068032
F-statistic: 7.60631 on 2 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.00067533

Max.
235.83527
Pr(>|t|)
1.43e-05 ***
0.001805 **
0.020056 *

P-value was less than 0.05 which makes the model significant. The significant
variables were number of board committees and leverage. The results show that by
using ROA, there is no significant relationship between number of board meetings and
firm performance but there is a negative significant relationship between number of
board committees and firm performance. This means that as number of board
committees and leverage increase, ROA decreases. Based on the results of Pearson
correlation matrix, there is a positive association between number of board committees
and board size which means that as the number of board committees increases, board
size increases. Accordingly, the negative relationship associated with increase in the
number of board committees is consistent with Bachiller, Giorgino and Paternostro’s
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(2014) and Kaur and Vij’s (2017) findings. They believed that increasing board size
negatively affects firm performance because of the concept of free riders. Also, Arora
and Sharma (2016) believed that there is a negative relationship between board size and
ROA because of difficulty in communication, coordination and the free riding issues.
In addition to that, this negative relationship may be due to the appointment of directors
who are busy outside directors (holding more than one directorship). Fich and
Shivdasani (2006) stated that busy directors are more likely to result in weak
governance which consequently affects the firm performance negatively. Busy
directors will not be able to effectively monitor the performance of the firm because
they will be unfocused, and monitoring activity will decline.

4.4 Results of model 2
In the second model, the relationship between board monitoring and firm
performance (represented by Tobin’s Q) was examined as shown in the below equation:
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑏𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽 𝑛𝑖𝑏
+ 𝛽 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
Where the definitions of the variables were provided in Table 1.
Firstly, the heterogeneity across the companies and time was examined. Figure
3 show that means are almost the same across years. However, Tobin’s Q does not have
equal means across different companies. Few companies are different from the rest as
shown in Figure 4. Accordingly, panel data was suggested to be used to incorporate the
effects of different companies on Tobin’s Q.
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity across years in terms of Tobin’s Q.

Figure 4. Heterogeneity across companies in terms of Tobin’s Q.

Different models were examined to reach the best model with Tobin’s Q. Time
effect was ignored in the first trial and companies’ effect were considered. Accordingly,
it was found that companies influence Tobin’s Q (as shown in Appendix 7). The second
trial was incorporating time effect into the model. The time was insignificant (as shown
in Appendix 8). OLS was used to ignore both time and companies’ effect (refer to
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Appendix 9). The results of the three trials show that time does not have an effect,
however companies have influence on Tobin’s Q. Accordingly, fixed model was used
to incorporate the companies as factors check for the individual fixed (Appendix 10). F
test also was carried out to check if fixed model or ordinary least squares was better (as
shown in Appendix 11), and the conclusion was that fixed model is better since the pvalue was less than 0.05. Then backward elimination technique was used to reach the
best model (as discussed in the previous section). The first model that includes all the
independent variables (before using the backward elimination method) are as shown in
Table 6.
Table 6: Fixed model results with Tobin’s Q
Unbalanced Panel: n = 188, T = 1-5, N = 716
Observations used in estimation: 188
Residuals:
Min.
-0.00321954
Coefficients:

1st Qu.
-0.00134079

Median
-0.00034736

3rd Qu.
0.00050149

Max.
0.05775967

Intercept
Audit
board size
Industry
Leverage

Estimate
6.1709e-03
4.9796e-04
-1.5570e-04
-6.7251e-04
-5.8296e-06

Std. Error
3.3011e-03
2.5953e-03
3.0414e-04
9.0663e-04
1.9640e-06

t-value
1.8693
0.1919
-0.5119
-0.7418
-2.9682

Pr(>|t|)
0.063212
0.848060
0.609330
0.459200
0.003405 **

Nbcom
Employees
Nib
nbmeeting

-9.2654e-04
2.0074e-06
8.3892e-05
9.0999e-05

5.1444e-04
1.7668e-06
3.6113e-04
1.7099e-04

-1.8011
1.1362
0.2323
0.5322

0.073377
0.257400
0.816566
0.595259

Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 0.0040475
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037148
R-Squared:
0.082192
Adj. R-Squared: 0.041173
F-statistic: 2.00374 on 8 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.04837

P-value was less than 0.05 so the model is significant. The significant variable
was leverage. Also, there is a positive relationship between number of board meetings
and firm performance. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between
number of board committees and firm performance. The relationship between number
of board meetings and firm performance differed based on the measure of firm
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performance which was used. By using ROA, the relationship was negative while the
relationship was positive by using Tobin’s Q. Then the backward elimination method
was used to remove the insignificant variables and reach the best model. The results are
as shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Fixed model results with Tobin’s Q after applying backward elimination
Unbalanced Panel: n = 191, T = 1-5, N = 734
Observations used in estimation: 191
Residuals:
Min.
-0.00307041

1st Qu.
-0.001218
01

Median
-0.00028878

3rd Qu.
0.00045478

Max.
0.05821628

Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error
t-value
Intercept
7.1256e-0 1.7044e-03
4.1806
3
Leverage
-5.2601e-0 1.8529e-06
-2.8389
6
Nbcom
-1.0341e-0 4.1406e-04
-2.4974
3
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 0.0040506
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037723
R-Squared:
0.068714
Adj. R-Squared: 0.058807
F-statistic: 6.93572 on 2 and 188 DF, p-value: 0.0012411

Pr(>|t|)
4.452e-05 ***
0.005024 **
0.013370 *

P-value was less than 0.05 which makes the model significant. The variables
which are significant in this model were number of board committees and leverage. The
results suggest that there is no significant relationship between number of board
meetings and firm performance but there is a negative significant relationship between
number of board committees and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). This means that as
number of board committees and leverage decreases, Tobin’s Q increases. Based on the
results of Pearson correlation matrix, there is a positive association between number of
board committees and board size. Accordingly, the negative relationship between
number of board committees and firm performance is consistent with Ammari,
Amdouni, Zemzem and Ellouze’s (2016) findings that support a negative relationship
between board size and market performance measure (Tobin’s Q) because as the board
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size increases, firm performance decreases, because of the coordination problems
which affects the ability of the board members to make proper decisions.
5.Conclusion
Corporate governance is an essential pillar for companies. There are several
definitions of corporate governance. This thesis focused on theedefinition in which
corporate governance is “a set of predefined rules which guide the actions of managers
resulting in the best interest of investors” (Srivastava, Das and Pattanayak, 2018: 2).
One of the principles of corporate governance is board of directors and their roles
(OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015). Board of directors is a mechanism
that is used to mitigate conflicts between shareholders and management. Various
aspects regarding the board of directors were covered by previous research such as
board diversity and board structure. There are few research studies about number of
board committees and firm performance.
Previous studies tried to test if there was a relationship between board of
directors and the firm performance. This thesis examined the relationship between
board monitoring and firm performance. Board monitoring was measured by the
number of board meetings and number of board committees. Firm performance was
measured by an accounting measure (ROA) and market performance measure (Tobin’s
Q). The sample was FTSE 150 for the years from 2013 to 2017. Control variables were:
number of independent board members, board size, leverage, audit, industry and
number of employees. The results showed that there was no significant relationship
between number of board meetings and firm performance. There was a negative
association between number of board meetings and ROA but there was a positive
relationship between number of board meetings and Tobin’s Q. However, there was a
significant negative relationship between number of board committees and firm
performance (by using ROA and Tobin’s Q). In addition to that, there was a positive
association between number of board committees and board size. Accordingly, as the
number of board committees increases, board size increases. This suggested that the
negative relationship between number of board committees and firm performance may
be due the increase in board size which leads the coordination, communication and freeriders problems that hindered the board of directors to monitor the management
properly and consequently affected the firm performance negatively. The negative
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relationship implies that number of board meetings and number of board committees
are not as important as the capabilities of the board members to apply rules and
procedures to achieve good corporate governance practices and consequently enhance
firm performance. Further research could add other board of directors’ characteristics
such as: level of education, CEO tenure, CFO tenure and CEO duality. There was a
limitation on the level of education of the board of directors since there is no available
data on previous board members qualifications.
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List of appendices
Appendix 1: Summary of the literature review
The following Table summarizes the studies that were covered in the previous literature review section. These studies focus to measure the
relationship between board monitoring and firm performance.

Study

Brick and
Chidambaran (2010)

Years

1999 to
2005

Country

United States
of America

Dependent
variables

ROA, Tobin’s Q
and price per share
(PPS)

Independent
variables

Results

-logarithm of
board meetings
- logarithm of the
product of annual
board meetings
and number of
independent
board members
-Independence of
board members
-Duality of the
CEO

-Board monitoring is
positively affecting the
firm value

Chou, Chung and
Yin (2013)

Arora and Sharma
(2016)

Ntim and Osei
(2011)

2006 and
2007

2001 to
2010

20022007

Taiwan

India

South Africa

-Percentage of
board meetings
attended by a
director
himself/herself
-Percentage of
meetings attended
by the authorized
representatives of
the director”

-Positive effect: if board of
directors attend the
meetings by themselves Negative effect: if they
authorize representatives to
attend the meeting on
behalf of them.

ROA, ROE, net
profit margin
(NPM), Tobin’s Q,
Stock returns (SR)

-Board size
-Board meeting
frequency
-Outside
directors.

-Positive effect: between
the frequency of board
meetings and firm
performance.
-Negative effect: between
board size and return on
assets, between
Independence of board of
directors and firm
performance

Tobin’s Q, ROA,
TSR (Total
shareholder return)

-Number of board
meetings, Natural
log of the total
number of board
meetings in a
year)

-High frequency of board
meetings leads to high
corporate performance

-ROA, EPS
(earning per share),
Sales to assets
ratio, Sales growth
rate
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Klein (1998)

1992 and
1993

United States
of America
(Companies
listed on S&P
500)

ROA, Jensen
productivity (It is
equal to the change
in market value of
equity minus a
benchmark return
on investment),
Market returns

- No relationship: between
the firm performance and
board composition.
-Board committee
- Board composition has
structure
marginal explanatory value
for various performance
measure

ROE, ROA

-Different board
committees
meetings`
frequency

- It was proved that some
of the committees have
effects on the firm
performance while others
do not
-A Positive relationship:
between the intensity of
board monitoring and firm
performance

Hoque, Islam and
Azam (2013)

1999 to
2007

Australia

Ebenezer (2017)

2008 to
2014

Nigeria and
Ghana

-ROA, Tobin’s Q

-Board meetings
frequency

Alhussayen and
Shabou (2016)

2008 to
2013

Saudi Arabia

-Tobin’s Q, M-B
ratio

- Board
committees’
independence

- A Positive relationship:
between board monitoring
and firm value.

Al-Daoud, Saidin,
Abidin (2016)

2009 to
2013

-Tobin’s Q, ROA

-Frequency of
board meetings

- A Positive relationship:
between frequency of
board meetings and firm
performance

Amman
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Eluyela,
Akintimehin,okere,
Ozordi, Osuma,
Ilogho and Oladipo
(2018)

Arosa, Iturralde and
Maseda (2013)

2011 to
2016

2006

Singla and Singh
(2019)

2007 to
2016

Rashid (2018)

20062011

Nigeria

Spain

India

Bangladesh

Tobin’s Q

-Number of board
meetings

-ROA

Board size,
Number of board
meetings

Tobin’s Q

- board
independence and
the independence
of audit
committee

-Tobin’s Q, ROA

-Board
independence

- A Positive relationship:
between the number of
board meetings and firm
performance
- A Negative relationship:
between number of
independent board
members and firm
performance
-A Negative relationship:
between board size and
firm performance.
-A Negative relationship:
between board
independence and firm
performance
-A Positive relationship:
between independence of
audit committee and firm
value
- No positive relationship:
between board
independence and firm
performance
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Yasser, Mamun and
Marcus (2017)

Lam and Lee (2012)

Ghasemi and Ab
Razak (2016)

2009 to
2013

2001 to
2003

Pakistan

Hong Kong

2010 to
2013

-ROA,ROE
,Economic value
added

-ROA, ROE,
return on capital
employed (ROCE),
market-to-book
value of
equity(MTBV)

-Earning per share
Malaysia

Alshetwi (2017)

2013 to
2015

Saudi Arabia

-ROA

-Number of
independent
members
- Board size
-Board
committees (the
presence of
remuneration
committee and
the presence of
nomination
committee)
-Board size
-Executive ratio
is (the ratio of the
executive
directors to total
members on the
board)

-Board size
-Board
independence

-A Positive relationship:
between board size and
firm performance.
-A Negative relationship:
between independent board
members and firm
performance
- A Negative relationship:
between remuneration
committee and firm
performance.
- A Positive relationship:
between nomination
committee and firm
performance
- A Positive relationship:
between the board size ad
firm profitability
- A Positive relationship:
between number of
executive and earning per
share
- A Negative relationship:
between board
independence and firm
performance
- No relationship :between
board size and firm
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Kalsie and
Shrivastav (2016)

Johl, Kaur and
Cooper (2015)

Ammari, Amdouni,
Zemzem and
Ellouze (2016)

2008 to
2012

2009

2001 to
2013

India

Malaysia

France

-ROA, Tobin’s Q, Market to book
value ratio
(MBVR), return on
capital employed
(ROCE)

-Board size

-ROA

-Board meetings,
board size, board
independence and
experience of
board of directors
in accounting

-ROA, Tobin’s Q

-Monitoring
committee
indicator with
board size
-Monitoring
committee
indicator with
board
independence

- A Positive
relationship: between board
size and firm performance.
-No relationship:
between board
independence and firm
performance – A Positive
relationship: between
experience of board of
directors in accounting,
board size and firm
performance
-A Negative relationship:
between large board size
and market performance. A Positive relationship:
between board size and
accounting performance if
there are at least three
committees.
-A Negative relationship:
between large number of
independent board
members and accounting
performance if there are at
least three committees

42

Alqatan,Chbib,
Hussainey (2019)

Kaur and Vij (2017)

2012 to
2015

2008 to
2014

United
Kingdom

India

-ROA, Tobin’s Q

-Board
independence
-Board size
-Board
remuneration

-ROA, Tobin’s Q,
Net interest
income, ROE

-Independent
members
-Board size
-frequency of
board meetings
-Number of
females director
- “percentage of
meetings attended
by the board of
directors”

-A Positive relationship:
between board size and
firm performance, between
board remuneration
and firm performance,
between board
independence and firm
performance

-A Positive relationship:
between small board size,
more female members on
the board, high numbers of
board meetings and firm
performance.
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Arora (2012)

Muhammad,
Rehman,Waqas
(2016)

2001 to
2010

2010 to
2014

India

Pakistan

-ROA, Tobin’s Q

-ROA, ROE

-Number of board
meetings
-Board size
-Outside board
members

-Board
composition Board size
- CEO duality
-Presence of audit
committee

-A Positive relationship:
between board size and
firm performance if they
used Tobin Q as measure
of firm performance.
-A Negative relationship:
between board size and
firm performance when
they used ROA as firm
performance indicator.
-A Positive relationship:
between inside directors
and firm performance,
between
number of board meetings
and firm performance
-A Positive relationship:
between board size and
firm performance
-A Negative relationship:
between CEO duality,
board composition and
firm performance
-A Positive relationship
between audit committee
and firm performance
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Appendix 2: ROA output without time effect
The following output shows the results for ROA ignoring time effect.
summary(olswt)
Call:
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.numeric(nib) +
as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q Max
-26.168 -1.293 0.000 1.397 40.868
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
2.327e+01 1.132e+01 2.056 0.040302 *
as.numeric(Audit) -1.112e+00 8.359e+00 -0.133 0.894194
as.numeric(board_size) 4.002e-01 3.824e-01 1.046 0.295850
as.factor(industry)1 -1.127e+00 3.350e+00 -0.337 0.736569
as.numeric(leverage) 5.127e-04 1.660e-03 0.309 0.757522
as.numeric(nbcom) -9.520e-01 7.764e-01 -1.226 0.220703
as.numeric(employees) -9.171e-04 2.126e-03 -0.431 0.666366
as.factor(company)2 1.258e+00 6.017e+00 0.209 0.834514
as.factor(company)3 -6.650e+00 3.538e+00 -1.879 0.060770 .
as.factor(company)4 -7.991e+00 5.036e+00 -1.587 0.113188
as.factor(company)5 -5.752e+00 3.738e+00 -1.539 0.124520
as.factor(company)6 -1.087e+01 5.208e+00 -2.087 0.037439 *
as.factor(company)8 -1.705e+01 4.954e+00 -3.442 0.000626 ***
as.factor(company)9 -1.231e+01 5.022e+00 -2.452 0.014572 *
as.factor(company)10 1.266e+00 5.348e+00 0.237 0.813002
as.factor(company)11 5.116e+00 4.743e+00 1.079 0.281225
as.factor(company)12 -9.118e+00 4.950e+00 -1.842 0.066066 .
as.factor(company)13 -1.144e+01 4.978e+00 -2.297 0.022031 *
as.factor(company)14 -1.131e+01 4.921e+00 -2.298 0.021998 *
as.factor(company)15 1.933e+01 5.830e+00 3.316 0.000981 ***
as.factor(company)16 -1.393e+01 3.591e+00 -3.880 0.000119 ***
as.factor(company)17 -9.878e+00 6.946e+00 -1.422 0.155662
as.factor(company)18 -1.258e+01 5.102e+00 -2.465 0.014024 *
as.factor(company)19 -1.280e+01 4.905e+00 -2.610 0.009329 **
as.factor(company)20 -1.374e+01 3.712e+00 -3.701 0.000239 ***
as.factor(company)21 -1.064e+01 4.873e+00 -2.183 0.029470 *
as.factor(company)22 -1.423e+01 6.952e+00 -2.047 0.041160 *
as.factor(company)23 -3.631e+00 5.342e+00 -0.680 0.496987
as.factor(company)24 -6.477e+00 5.077e+00 -1.276 0.202613
as.factor(company)26 -9.937e+00 5.076e+00 -1.958 0.050804 .
as.factor(company)27 -9.724e+00 5.413e+00 -1.797 0.073018 .
as.factor(company)28 -1.141e+01 5.333e+00 -2.139 0.032918 *
as.factor(company)29 4.318e+00 4.949e+00 0.873 0.383329
as.factor(company)30 -9.426e+00 5.027e+00 -1.875 0.061365 .

as.factor(company)32
as.factor(company)33
as.factor(company)34
as.factor(company)35
as.factor(company)36
as.factor(company)37
as.factor(company)38
as.factor(company)39
as.factor(company)41
as.factor(company)43
as.factor(company)44
as.factor(company)45
as.factor(company)46
as.factor(company)47
as.factor(company)48
as.factor(company)49
as.factor(company)50
as.factor(company)51
as.factor(company)52
as.factor(company)53
as.factor(company)54
as.factor(company)55
as.factor(company)56
as.factor(company)57
as.factor(company)59
as.factor(company)60
as.factor(company)61
as.factor(company)62
as.factor(company)63
as.factor(company)64
as.factor(company)65
as.factor(company)66
as.factor(company)67
as.factor(company)68
as.factor(company)69
as.factor(company)70
as.factor(company)71
as.factor(company)72
as.factor(company)73
as.factor(company)74
as.factor(company)75
as.factor(company)76
as.factor(company)77
as.factor(company)79
as.factor(company)80
as.factor(company)81
as.factor(company)82
as.factor(company)83
as.factor(company)84
as.factor(company)85

-5.381e+00
-1.473e+01
-1.135e+01
-1.625e+00
-1.550e+01
-1.737e+01
-6.957e+00
-1.054e+01
-1.511e+01
-1.529e+01
-1.323e+01
-8.056e+00
-1.251e+01
-1.186e+01
-2.358e+00
-1.308e+01
-7.324e+00
-6.555e+00
-9.900e+00
-1.481e+01
-1.508e+01
7.144e+00
-6.163e+00
-1.228e+01
-1.396e+01
-8.012e+00
-1.114e+01
-1.331e+01
-1.253e+01
-5.506e+00
-1.595e+01
-3.013e+00
-1.120e+01
-6.676e+00
-1.150e+01
1.267e+01
-5.573e+00
-5.281e+00
-7.312e+00
-1.209e+01
-1.115e+01
9.007e+00
-1.079e+01
5.387e+00
-7.973e+00
-1.290e+01
-1.140e+01
-1.410e+01
-9.824e+00
4.810e+00

5.005e+00
5.784e+00
4.966e+00
4.975e+00
6.983e+00
5.040e+00
5.008e+00
4.954e+00
4.868e+00
5.374e+00
5.229e+00
4.867e+00
6.911e+00
5.020e+00
4.963e+00
4.989e+00
5.183e+00
5.001e+00
4.037e+00
4.442e+00
5.765e+00
6.947e+00
5.067e+00
6.970e+00
5.739e+00
5.037e+00
4.928e+00
4.867e+00
5.364e+00
5.096e+00
5.225e+00
5.143e+00
6.929e+00
4.973e+00
5.003e+00
3.590e+00
6.097e+00
4.082e+00
6.188e+00
4.884e+00
3.802e+00
5.141e+00
4.567e+00
3.786e+00
5.149e+00
4.960e+00
4.853e+00
5.006e+00
5.015e+00
4.936e+00

-1.075 0.282846
-2.546 0.011186 *
-2.285 0.022759 *
-0.327 0.744137
-2.219 0.026912 *
-3.447 0.000615 ***
-1.389 0.165418
-2.128 0.033794 *
-3.105 0.002013 **
-2.844 0.004634 **
-2.531 0.011682 *
-1.655 0.098525 .
-1.810 0.070955 .
-2.362 0.018560 *
-0.475 0.634934
-2.622 0.009006 **
-1.413 0.158286
-1.311 0.190519
-2.452 0.014536 *
-3.333 0.000923 ***
-2.615 0.009192 **
1.028 0.304318
-1.216 0.224419
-1.762 0.078679 .
-2.433 0.015341 *
-1.591 0.112344
-2.262 0.024159 *
-2.735 0.006468 **
-2.336 0.019901 *
-1.080 0.280499
-3.053 0.002391 **
-0.586 0.558180
-1.616 0.106813
-1.342 0.180092
-2.300 0.021883 *
3.529 0.000457 ***
-0.914 0.361089
-1.294 0.196301
-1.182 0.237927
-2.476 0.013616 *
-2.932 0.003526 **
1.752 0.080397 .
-2.362 0.018578 *
1.423 0.155444
-1.548 0.122152
-2.600 0.009602 **
-2.350 0.019173 *
-2.816 0.005051 **
-1.959 0.050695 .
0.974 0.330365
46

as.factor(company)86 -1.240e+01 5.849e+00 -2.121 0.034440 *
as.factor(company)87 -1.164e+01 4.956e+00 -2.349 0.019241 *
as.factor(company)88 -1.221e+01 4.942e+00 -2.470 0.013847 *
as.factor(company)90 -2.465e+00 4.965e+00 -0.496 0.619785
as.factor(company)91 -1.379e+01 6.953e+00 -1.983 0.047906 *
as.factor(company)92 -1.273e+01 4.904e+00 -2.597 0.009698 **
as.factor(company)93 -2.864e+00 5.793e+00 -0.494 0.621173
as.factor(company)94 -9.355e+00 4.983e+00 -1.878 0.061028 .
as.factor(company)95 -1.877e+01 5.389e+00 -3.482 0.000541 ***
as.factor(company)96 -1.214e+01 5.004e+00 -2.426 0.015613 *
as.factor(company)97 -8.285e+00 6.977e+00 -1.187 0.235644
as.factor(company)98 -8.053e+00 4.965e+00 -1.622 0.105415
as.factor(company)99 -1.532e+01 3.593e+00 -4.264 2.41e-05 ***
as.factor(company)100 -1.501e+01 4.645e+00 -3.231 0.001318 **
as.factor(company)101 -1.584e+01 3.814e+00 -4.152 3.88e-05 ***
as.factor(company)102 -1.507e+01 4.272e+00 -3.528 0.000458 ***
as.factor(company)103 -1.246e+01 5.119e+00 -2.433 0.015315 *
as.factor(company)104 -1.229e+01 5.686e+00 -2.162 0.031127 *
as.factor(company)105 -1.312e+01 4.928e+00 -2.663 0.008005 **
as.factor(company)106 4.159e+00 5.353e+00 0.777 0.437557
as.factor(company)107 -1.104e+01 5.025e+00 -2.197 0.028521 *
as.factor(company)109 -1.335e+01 5.334e+00 -2.502 0.012663 *
as.factor(company)110 -1.193e+01 6.956e+00 -1.715 0.087000 .
as.factor(company)111 -8.818e+00 4.853e+00 -1.817 0.069824 .
as.factor(company)112 -1.531e+01 5.697e+00 -2.687 0.007459 **
as.factor(company)113 -9.093e+00 4.954e+00 -1.835 0.067040 .
as.factor(company)114 9.889e+00 4.977e+00 1.987 0.047472 *
as.factor(company)115 -9.650e+00 6.922e+00 -1.394 0.163920
as.factor(company)116 -1.563e+01 7.101e+00 -2.202 0.028140 *
as.factor(company)117 -1.523e+01 4.080e+00 -3.733 0.000211 ***
as.factor(company)118 -3.426e+01 6.860e+00 -4.995 8.17e-07 ***
as.factor(company)119 -1.428e+01 5.801e+00 -2.461 0.014203 *
as.factor(company)120 -1.706e+01 4.874e+00 -3.501 0.000505 ***
as.factor(company)121 -1.439e+01 4.842e+00 -2.972 0.003102 **
as.factor(company)122 -4.389e+00 4.857e+00 -0.904 0.366635
as.factor(company)123 -1.641e+01 4.880e+00 -3.363 0.000831 ***
as.factor(company)124 -1.547e+01 6.042e+00 -2.561 0.010740 *
as.factor(company)125 -8.730e+00 1.096e+01 -0.797 0.426046
as.factor(company)126 -1.344e+01 5.045e+00 -2.664 0.007972 **
as.factor(company)127 -1.317e+01 7.050e+00 -1.868 0.062410 .
as.factor(company)128 -7.478e+00 3.469e+00 -2.156 0.031587 *
as.factor(company)129 -1.419e+01 4.040e+00 -3.513 0.000484 ***
as.factor(company)130 -1.217e+01 1.089e+01 -1.118 0.264232
as.factor(company)131 -1.423e+00 5.028e+00 -0.283 0.777272
as.factor(company)132 -5.350e+00 4.852e+00 -1.103 0.270739
as.factor(company)134 -5.152e+00 5.100e+00 -1.010 0.312869
as.factor(company)136 -1.274e+01 5.328e+00 -2.391 0.017194 *
as.factor(company)137 2.372e+02 4.959e+00 47.818 < 2e-16 ***
as.factor(company)138 -1.044e+01 5.012e+00 -2.082 0.037817 *
as.factor(company)139 -4.997e+00 3.566e+00 -1.401 0.161768
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as.factor(company)140
as.factor(company)141
as.factor(company)143
as.factor(company)144
as.factor(company)145
as.factor(company)146
as.factor(company)147
as.factor(company)153
as.factor(company)154
as.factor(company)155
as.factor(company)157
as.factor(company)158
as.factor(company)159
as.factor(company)160
as.factor(company)161
as.factor(company)162
as.factor(company)163
as.factor(company)164
as.factor(company)165
as.factor(company)166
as.factor(company)167
as.factor(company)168
as.factor(company)169
as.factor(company)170
as.factor(company)171
as.factor(company)172
as.factor(company)173
as.factor(company)174
as.factor(company)175
as.factor(company)176
as.factor(company)177
as.factor(company)178
as.factor(company)179
as.factor(company)180
as.factor(company)181
as.factor(company)182
as.factor(company)183
as.factor(company)184
as.factor(company)185
as.factor(company)186
as.factor(company)187
as.factor(company)188
as.factor(company)189
as.factor(company)190
as.factor(company)191
as.factor(company)192
as.factor(company)193
as.factor(company)194
as.factor(company)195
as.factor(company)196

-1.408e+01
1.983e+00
-1.285e+01
-7.706e+00
-1.564e+01
-1.418e+01
-1.071e+01
-1.141e+01
-9.726e+00
-3.091e+00
-6.632e+00
-1.348e+01
-8.542e+00
-1.118e+01
-6.215e+00
-3.401e+00
-7.252e+00
-1.319e+01
-1.687e+01
-7.525e+00
-1.862e+00
-1.157e+01
-1.339e+01
-8.360e+00
-7.617e+00
-8.689e+00
-1.756e+01
-1.773e+01
-1.581e+01
-1.327e+01
-1.674e+01
-2.277e+01
-9.736e+00
-4.479e+00
-1.091e+01
-1.736e+01
-6.550e+00
-1.682e+01
-8.236e+00
-9.871e+00
-1.385e+01
-1.081e+01
-1.416e+01
-1.054e+01
-1.125e+01
-1.476e+01
-1.161e+01
-1.403e+01
-1.646e+01
-6.596e+00

5.070e+00
5.791e+00
4.976e+00
4.982e+00
6.966e+00
3.492e+00
5.579e+00
4.880e+00
6.958e+00
4.867e+00
4.874e+00
4.967e+00
5.012e+00
5.891e+00
5.127e+00
4.870e+00
1.099e+01
4.825e+00
3.515e+00
5.670e+00
3.643e+00
4.338e+00
5.146e+00
4.890e+00
4.944e+00
6.871e+00
4.880e+00
6.836e+00
5.956e+00
4.815e+00
5.983e+00
4.898e+00
5.371e+00
5.082e+00
4.806e+00
5.662e+00
5.107e+00
5.153e+00
5.012e+00
5.039e+00
6.846e+00
4.971e+00
4.843e+00
5.705e+00
5.402e+00
4.027e+00
6.843e+00
4.855e+00
3.997e+00
4.990e+00

-2.777 0.005702 **
0.342 0.732202
-2.582 0.010106 *
-1.547 0.122560
-2.245 0.025211 *
-4.061 5.68e-05 ***
-1.919 0.055568 .
-2.339 0.019755 *
-1.398 0.162799
-0.635 0.525678
-1.361 0.174242
-2.714 0.006886 **
-1.704 0.088924 .
-1.899 0.058203 .
-1.212 0.225979
-0.698 0.485372
-0.660 0.509488
-2.734 0.006474 **
-4.800 2.10e-06 ***
-1.327 0.185062
-0.511 0.609390
-2.668 0.007887 **
-2.602 0.009534 **
-1.709 0.088008 .
-1.541 0.124010
-1.265 0.206597
-3.597 0.000354 ***
-2.594 0.009782 **
-2.655 0.008180 **
-2.756 0.006075 **
-2.798 0.005335 **
-4.649 4.28e-06 ***
-1.813 0.070489 .
-0.881 0.378531
-2.270 0.023654 *
-3.066 0.002292 **
-1.283 0.200222
-3.264 0.001177 **
-1.643 0.100931
-1.959 0.050667 .
-2.023 0.043662 *
-2.174 0.030180 *
-2.925 0.003609 **
-1.847 0.065299 .
-2.082 0.037832 *
-3.665 0.000275 ***
-1.697 0.090339 .
-2.890 0.004023 **
-4.117 4.50e-05 ***
-1.322 0.186825
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as.factor(company)197 -1.446e+01 7.005e+00 -2.064 0.039586 *
as.factor(company)199 -1.055e+01 4.994e+00 -2.113 0.035118 *
as.numeric(nib)
-7.539e-01 4.430e-01 -1.702 0.089457 .
as.numeric(nbmeeting) -2.906e-02 1.386e-01 -0.210 0.833965
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 5.411 on 493 degrees of freedom
(64 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.9583,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9425
F-statistic: 60.55 on 187 and 493 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Appendix 3: ROA output with time effect
The following output shows the results for ROA with taking time into consideration.

summary(olswtt)

Call:
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.factor(Year) +
as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q Max
-26.037 -1.446 0.016 1.491 40.454
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
2.482e+01 1.139e+01 2.180 0.029765 *
as.numeric(Audit) -2.239e+00 8.377e+00 -0.267 0.789384
as.numeric(board_size) 3.577e-01 3.960e-01 0.903 0.366815
as.factor(industry)1 -1.162e+00 3.353e+00 -0.346 0.729142
as.numeric(leverage) 2.637e-04 1.663e-03 0.159 0.874051
as.numeric(nbcom) -9.320e-01 7.793e-01 -1.196 0.232280
as.numeric(employees) -1.521e-03 2.147e-03 -0.709 0.478887
as.factor(company)2 1.397e+00 6.026e+00 0.232 0.816783
as.factor(company)3 -6.404e+00 3.539e+00 -1.810 0.070961 .
as.factor(company)4 -7.697e+00 5.035e+00 -1.529 0.126988
as.factor(company)5 -5.880e+00 3.739e+00 -1.573 0.116418
as.factor(company)6 -1.103e+01 5.207e+00 -2.118 0.034666 *
as.factor(company)8 -1.677e+01 4.959e+00 -3.382 0.000778 ***
as.factor(company)9 -1.229e+01 5.019e+00 -2.449 0.014694 *
as.factor(company)10 1.114e+00 5.344e+00 0.209 0.834888
as.factor(company)11 4.800e+00 4.747e+00 1.011 0.312382
as.factor(company)12 -9.141e+00 4.951e+00 -1.846 0.065438 .
as.factor(company)13 -1.159e+01 4.977e+00 -2.328 0.020324 *
as.factor(company)14 -1.107e+01 4.921e+00 -2.250 0.024916 *
as.factor(company)15 1.961e+01 5.841e+00 3.358 0.000847 ***
as.factor(company)16 -1.374e+01 3.591e+00 -3.827 0.000147 ***
as.factor(company)17 -1.025e+01 6.963e+00 -1.472 0.141564
as.factor(company)18 -1.230e+01 5.117e+00 -2.404 0.016593 *
as.factor(company)19 -1.252e+01 4.905e+00 -2.552 0.011021 *
as.factor(company)20 -1.360e+01 3.711e+00 -3.665 0.000274 ***
as.factor(company)21 -1.052e+01 4.871e+00 -2.160 0.031275 *
as.factor(company)22 -1.446e+01 6.965e+00 -2.076 0.038445 *
as.factor(company)23 -3.641e+00 5.338e+00 -0.682 0.495595
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as.factor(company)24
as.factor(company)26
as.factor(company)27
as.factor(company)28
as.factor(company)29
as.factor(company)30
as.factor(company)32
as.factor(company)33
as.factor(company)34
as.factor(company)35
as.factor(company)36
as.factor(company)37
as.factor(company)38
as.factor(company)39
as.factor(company)41
as.factor(company)43
as.factor(company)44
as.factor(company)45
as.factor(company)46
as.factor(company)47
as.factor(company)48
as.factor(company)49
as.factor(company)50
as.factor(company)51
as.factor(company)52
as.factor(company)53
as.factor(company)54
as.factor(company)55
as.factor(company)56
as.factor(company)57
as.factor(company)59
as.factor(company)60
as.factor(company)61
as.factor(company)62
as.factor(company)63
as.factor(company)64
as.factor(company)65
as.factor(company)66
as.factor(company)67
as.factor(company)68
as.factor(company)69
as.factor(company)70
as.factor(company)71
as.factor(company)72
as.factor(company)73
as.factor(company)74
as.factor(company)75
as.factor(company)76
as.factor(company)77
as.factor(company)79

-6.538e+00
-9.744e+00
-9.290e+00
-1.100e+01
4.558e+00
-9.162e+00
-5.323e+00
-1.494e+01
-1.143e+01
-1.555e+00
-1.525e+01
-1.714e+01
-6.816e+00
-1.031e+01
-1.499e+01
-1.552e+01
-1.309e+01
-7.927e+00
-1.276e+01
-1.151e+01
-2.258e+00
-1.284e+01
-7.308e+00
-6.520e+00
-9.796e+00
-1.440e+01
-1.539e+01
7.443e+00
-5.964e+00
-1.202e+01
-1.383e+01
-8.094e+00
-1.109e+01
-1.315e+01
-1.228e+01
-5.238e+00
-1.594e+01
-2.667e+00
-1.056e+01
-6.555e+00
-1.127e+01
1.268e+01
-5.959e+00
-5.430e+00
-7.883e+00
-1.185e+01
-1.127e+01
9.048e+00
-1.051e+01
5.255e+00

5.082e+00
5.084e+00
5.421e+00
5.337e+00
4.951e+00
5.030e+00
5.007e+00
5.781e+00
4.964e+00
4.976e+00
6.988e+00
5.051e+00
5.006e+00
4.959e+00
4.868e+00
5.375e+00
5.243e+00
4.868e+00
6.931e+00
5.023e+00
4.962e+00
4.989e+00
5.194e+00
5.003e+00
4.040e+00
4.478e+00
5.769e+00
6.953e+00
5.069e+00
6.968e+00
5.744e+00
5.040e+00
4.933e+00
4.868e+00
5.373e+00
5.105e+00
5.221e+00
5.142e+00
6.938e+00
4.974e+00
5.007e+00
3.587e+00
6.097e+00
4.088e+00
6.192e+00
4.883e+00
3.809e+00
5.138e+00
4.581e+00
3.784e+00

-1.287 0.198869
-1.917 0.055845 .
-1.714 0.087237 .
-2.061 0.039789 *
0.921 0.357708
-1.821 0.069147 .
-1.063 0.288208
-2.583 0.010070 *
-2.303 0.021710 *
-0.312 0.754822
-2.182 0.029582 *
-3.393 0.000748 ***
-1.362 0.173981
-2.079 0.038165 *
-3.079 0.002191 **
-2.887 0.004067 **
-2.496 0.012902 *
-1.628 0.104079
-1.841 0.066166 .
-2.292 0.022341 *
-0.455 0.649298
-2.573 0.010369 *
-1.407 0.160023
-1.303 0.193050
-2.425 0.015690 *
-3.216 0.001388 **
-2.668 0.007875 **
1.070 0.284952
-1.177 0.239916
-1.725 0.085216 .
-2.407 0.016438 *
-1.606 0.108926
-2.247 0.025088 *
-2.701 0.007155 **
-2.285 0.022723 *
-1.026 0.305409
-3.052 0.002393 **
-0.519 0.604282
-1.523 0.128529
-1.318 0.188135
-2.251 0.024842 *
3.534 0.000447 ***
-0.977 0.328832
-1.328 0.184768
-1.273 0.203598
-2.426 0.015625 *
-2.960 0.003226 **
1.761 0.078886 .
-2.293 0.022248 *
1.389 0.165496
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as.factor(company)80 -7.868e+00 5.148e+00 -1.528 0.127107
as.factor(company)81 -1.287e+01 4.961e+00 -2.595 0.009730 **
as.factor(company)82 -1.154e+01 4.861e+00 -2.374 0.017959 *
as.factor(company)83 -1.388e+01 5.004e+00 -2.773 0.005762 **
as.factor(company)84 -9.942e+00 5.020e+00 -1.980 0.048212 *
as.factor(company)85 5.011e+00 4.937e+00 1.015 0.310549
as.factor(company)86 -1.236e+01 5.857e+00 -2.110 0.035363 *
as.factor(company)87 -1.155e+01 4.955e+00 -2.331 0.020165 *
as.factor(company)88 -1.219e+01 4.946e+00 -2.465 0.014037 *
as.factor(company)90 -2.326e+00 4.962e+00 -0.469 0.639531
as.factor(company)91 -1.399e+01 6.966e+00 -2.008 0.045196 *
as.factor(company)92 -1.264e+01 4.909e+00 -2.575 0.010325 *
as.factor(company)93 -2.810e+00 5.795e+00 -0.485 0.627961
as.factor(company)94 -9.264e+00 4.983e+00 -1.859 0.063630 .
as.factor(company)95 -1.881e+01 5.393e+00 -3.488 0.000530 ***
as.factor(company)96 -1.185e+01 5.004e+00 -2.368 0.018288 *
as.factor(company)97 -8.103e+00 6.998e+00 -1.158 0.247486
as.factor(company)98 -7.973e+00 4.963e+00 -1.606 0.108824
as.factor(company)99 -1.495e+01 3.597e+00 -4.155 3.84e-05 ***
as.factor(company)100 -1.492e+01 4.643e+00 -3.213 0.001401 **
as.factor(company)101 -1.559e+01 3.818e+00 -4.084 5.16e-05 ***
as.factor(company)102 -1.491e+01 4.276e+00 -3.486 0.000534 ***
as.factor(company)103 -1.203e+01 5.130e+00 -2.346 0.019371 *
as.factor(company)104 -1.202e+01 5.694e+00 -2.111 0.035265 *
as.factor(company)105 -1.321e+01 4.927e+00 -2.682 0.007569 **
as.factor(company)106 3.945e+00 5.353e+00 0.737 0.461515
as.factor(company)107 -1.108e+01 5.028e+00 -2.204 0.028021 *
as.factor(company)109 -1.311e+01 5.340e+00 -2.455 0.014416 *
as.factor(company)110 -1.192e+01 6.971e+00 -1.711 0.087792 .
as.factor(company)111 -8.791e+00 4.852e+00 -1.812 0.070657 .
as.factor(company)112 -1.562e+01 5.707e+00 -2.737 0.006429 **
as.factor(company)113 -8.995e+00 4.955e+00 -1.815 0.070061 .
as.factor(company)114 9.969e+00 4.979e+00 2.002 0.045809 *
as.factor(company)115 -1.017e+01 6.947e+00 -1.464 0.143952
as.factor(company)116 -1.578e+01 7.128e+00 -2.214 0.027294 *
as.factor(company)117 -1.504e+01 4.077e+00 -3.690 0.000250 ***
as.factor(company)118 -3.422e+01 6.869e+00 -4.982 8.76e-07 ***
as.factor(company)119 -1.379e+01 5.816e+00 -2.371 0.018117 *
as.factor(company)120 -1.701e+01 4.875e+00 -3.489 0.000529 ***
as.factor(company)121 -1.434e+01 4.840e+00 -2.962 0.003203 **
as.factor(company)122 -4.451e+00 4.856e+00 -0.916 0.359870
as.factor(company)123 -1.652e+01 4.879e+00 -3.386 0.000766 ***
as.factor(company)124 -1.591e+01 6.052e+00 -2.629 0.008835 **
as.factor(company)125 -9.643e+00 1.096e+01 -0.880 0.379486
as.factor(company)126 -1.342e+01 5.050e+00 -2.658 0.008115 **
as.factor(company)127 -1.254e+01 7.056e+00 -1.778 0.076023 .
as.factor(company)128 -7.398e+00 3.469e+00 -2.133 0.033444 *
as.factor(company)129 -1.387e+01 4.076e+00 -3.403 0.000721 ***
as.factor(company)130 -1.334e+01 1.091e+01 -1.223 0.221855
as.factor(company)131 -1.289e+00 5.032e+00 -0.256 0.797987
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as.factor(company)132
as.factor(company)134
as.factor(company)136
as.factor(company)137
as.factor(company)138
as.factor(company)139
as.factor(company)140
as.factor(company)141
as.factor(company)143
as.factor(company)144
as.factor(company)145
as.factor(company)146
as.factor(company)147
as.factor(company)153
as.factor(company)154
as.factor(company)155
as.factor(company)157
as.factor(company)158
as.factor(company)159
as.factor(company)160
as.factor(company)161
as.factor(company)162
as.factor(company)163
as.factor(company)164
as.factor(company)165
as.factor(company)166
as.factor(company)167
as.factor(company)168
as.factor(company)169
as.factor(company)170
as.factor(company)171
as.factor(company)172
as.factor(company)173
as.factor(company)174
as.factor(company)175
as.factor(company)176
as.factor(company)177
as.factor(company)178
as.factor(company)179
as.factor(company)180
as.factor(company)181
as.factor(company)182
as.factor(company)183
as.factor(company)184
as.factor(company)185
as.factor(company)186
as.factor(company)187
as.factor(company)188
as.factor(company)189
as.factor(company)190

-5.393e+00
-5.147e+00
-1.280e+01
2.372e+02
-1.014e+01
-4.901e+00
-1.378e+01
1.780e+00
-1.253e+01
-7.860e+00
-1.607e+01
-1.418e+01
-1.022e+01
-1.118e+01
-1.012e+01
-2.985e+00
-6.703e+00
-1.354e+01
-8.448e+00
-1.086e+01
-6.217e+00
-3.310e+00
-8.647e+00
-1.330e+01
-1.688e+01
-7.689e+00
-1.999e+00
-1.109e+01
-1.329e+01
-8.216e+00
-7.557e+00
-8.294e+00
-1.742e+01
-1.841e+01
-1.611e+01
-1.332e+01
-1.661e+01
-2.285e+01
-9.514e+00
-4.382e+00
-1.086e+01
-1.762e+01
-6.383e+00
-1.687e+01
-8.019e+00
-9.861e+00
-1.443e+01
-1.072e+01
-1.414e+01
-1.035e+01

4.855e+00
5.099e+00
5.325e+00
4.957e+00
5.013e+00
3.575e+00
5.071e+00
5.791e+00
4.977e+00
4.982e+00
6.983e+00
3.490e+00
5.596e+00
4.880e+00
6.984e+00
4.869e+00
4.876e+00
4.965e+00
5.010e+00
5.908e+00
5.122e+00
4.871e+00
1.100e+01
4.828e+00
3.516e+00
5.680e+00
3.640e+00
4.339e+00
5.145e+00
4.893e+00
4.942e+00
6.888e+00
4.881e+00
6.850e+00
5.966e+00
4.813e+00
5.985e+00
4.899e+00
5.371e+00
5.090e+00
4.805e+00
5.675e+00
5.109e+00
5.151e+00
5.016e+00
5.042e+00
6.856e+00
4.971e+00
4.842e+00
5.721e+00

-1.111 0.267148
-1.009 0.313245
-2.404 0.016602 *
47.841 < 2e-16 ***
-2.022 0.043697 *
-1.371 0.171074
-2.718 0.006798 **
0.307 0.758765
-2.518 0.012107 *
-1.578 0.115249
-2.301 0.021822 *
-4.063 5.65e-05 ***
-1.826 0.068453 .
-2.290 0.022441 *
-1.449 0.148035
-0.613 0.540167
-1.375 0.169825
-2.728 0.006598 **
-1.686 0.092369 .
-1.839 0.066522 .
-1.214 0.225433
-0.679 0.497176
-0.786 0.432289
-2.755 0.006092 **
-4.801 2.10e-06 ***
-1.354 0.176429
-0.549 0.583208
-2.556 0.010901 *
-2.583 0.010097 *
-1.679 0.093726 .
-1.529 0.126875
-1.204 0.229138
-3.569 0.000394 ***
-2.688 0.007437 **
-2.701 0.007153 **
-2.768 0.005851 **
-2.776 0.005718 **
-4.664 4.01e-06 ***
-1.771 0.077128 .
-0.861 0.389680
-2.260 0.024290 *
-3.106 0.002008 **
-1.249 0.212093
-3.274 0.001134 **
-1.599 0.110544
-1.956 0.051050 .
-2.105 0.035838 *
-2.156 0.031554 *
-2.920 0.003664 **
-1.808 0.071168 .
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as.factor(company)191 -1.110e+01 5.411e+00 -2.052 0.040661 *
as.factor(company)192 -1.433e+01 4.041e+00 -3.545 0.000430 ***
as.factor(company)193 -1.080e+01 6.855e+00 -1.575 0.115935
as.factor(company)194 -1.406e+01 4.855e+00 -2.896 0.003943 **
as.factor(company)195 -1.639e+01 4.006e+00 -4.090 5.03e-05 ***
as.factor(company)196 -6.514e+00 4.991e+00 -1.305 0.192467
as.factor(company)197 -1.400e+01 7.012e+00 -1.997 0.046354 *
as.factor(company)199 -1.063e+01 4.992e+00 -2.130 0.033639 *
as.factor(Year)2014 8.541e-01 7.088e-01 1.205 0.228739
as.factor(Year)2015 1.160e-01 7.318e-01 0.159 0.874109
as.factor(Year)2016 -5.498e-01 7.545e-01 -0.729 0.466545
as.factor(Year)2017 6.033e-01 7.357e-01 0.820 0.412612
as.numeric(nib)
-7.405e-01 4.603e-01 -1.609 0.108305
as.numeric(nbmeeting) -4.768e-02 1.493e-01 -0.319 0.749554
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 5.404 on 489 degrees of freedom
(64 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.9587,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9426
F-statistic: 59.45 on 191 and 489 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Appendix 4: ROA OLS output
The following output (using ordinary least square method) ignored both time and
companies’ effect with ROA.
ols2 <lm(ROA~+as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nume
ric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.numeric(nib)+as.numer
ic(nbmeeting), data=mydata)
summary(ols2)

Call:
lm(formula = ROA ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),
data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q Max
-31.210 -6.698 -1.598 2.762 249.072
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
32.100123 8.191576 3.919 9.82e-05 ***
as.numeric(Audit)
4.818390 6.740731 0.715 0.47497
as.numeric(board_size) -0.975516 0.698982 -1.396 0.16329
as.factor(industry)1 -1.539586 2.409255 -0.639 0.52302
as.numeric(leverage) -0.020816 0.004174 -4.987 7.83e-07 ***
as.numeric(nbcom) -3.584221 1.168632 -3.067 0.00225 **
as.numeric(employees) 0.005759 0.004067 1.416 0.15719
as.numeric(nib)
0.301754 0.804261 0.375 0.70763
as.numeric(nbmeeting) -0.080419 0.350926 -0.229 0.81881
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 21.89 on 672 degrees of freedom
(64 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.06918,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.05809
F-statistic: 6.243 on 8 and 672 DF, p-value: 8.337e-08
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Appendix 5: ROA fixed model
This is the fixed model that takes companies’ effect as factors.
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model
Call:
plm(formula = ROA ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),
data = mydata, model = "between", index = c("company"))
Unbalanced Panel: n = 180, T = 1-5, N = 681
Observations used in estimation: 180
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
Max.
-30.32926 -5.40913 -0.75183 3.17023 234.92089
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
34.7302771 14.0002955 2.4807 0.014080 *
as.numeric(Audit)
3.0091357 10.9208493 0.2755 0.783234
as.numeric(board_size) -1.1867578 1.2963523 -0.9155 0.361240
as.factor(industry)1 -1.8909339 4.0937127 -0.4619 0.644732
as.numeric(leverage) -0.0261351 0.0083903 -3.1149 0.002158 **
as.numeric(nbcom) -3.4809019 2.2503888 -1.5468 0.123760
as.numeric(employees) 0.0082303 0.0075488 1.0903 0.277126
as.numeric(nib)
0.7199976 1.5532249 0.4636 0.643560
as.numeric(nbmeeting) -0.2955304 0.7341947 -0.4025 0.687802
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 68979
Residual Sum of Squares: 62810
R-Squared:
0.089422
Adj. R-Squared: 0.046822
F-statistic: 2.09911 on 8 and 171 DF, p-value: 0.038333
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Appendix 6: ROA f-test
This is F test to show which model is better (fixed model or ordinary least square
method).
pFtest(fixed,ols2)
F test for individual effects
data: ROA ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) + as.factor(industry) + ...
F = 1.4085, df1 = 501, df2 = 171, p-value = 0.004235
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
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Appendix 7: Tobin’s Q output without time effect
The following output shows the results for Tobin’s Q ignoring time effect.

olswt <lm(TobinQ~+as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nu
meric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.factor(company)+as.
numeric(nib)+as.numeric(nbmeeting), data=mydata)
summary(olswt)
Call:
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.numeric(nib) +
as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q
Max
-0.0070847 -0.0000885 0.0000000 0.0000992 0.0093031
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
1.133e-03 1.380e-03 0.821 0.411840
as.numeric(Audit) -9.780e-05 1.030e-03 -0.095 0.924423
as.numeric(board_size) 4.462e-05 4.605e-05 0.969 0.333119
as.factor(industry)1 3.614e-05 4.096e-04 0.088 0.929719
as.numeric(leverage) -1.906e-07 2.030e-07 -0.939 0.348179
as.numeric(nbcom) -6.453e-05 8.954e-05 -0.721 0.471447
as.numeric(employees) 1.937e-07 2.493e-07 0.777 0.437513
as.factor(company)2 8.876e-05 7.423e-04 0.120 0.904868
as.factor(company)3 3.132e-04 4.361e-04 0.718 0.472925
as.factor(company)4 9.316e-04 6.185e-04 1.506 0.132591
as.factor(company)5 -1.301e-04 4.597e-04 -0.283 0.777237
as.factor(company)6 -1.698e-05 6.401e-04 -0.027 0.978842
as.factor(company)7 -6.207e-04 5.700e-04 -1.089 0.276742
as.factor(company)8 -4.341e-04 6.080e-04 -0.714 0.475529
as.factor(company)9 -2.789e-06 5.985e-04 -0.005 0.996283
as.factor(company)10 6.563e-03 6.555e-04 10.013 < 2e-16 ***
as.factor(company)11 2.284e-03 5.828e-04 3.919 0.000101 ***
as.factor(company)12 2.523e-04 6.073e-04 0.415 0.678006
as.factor(company)13 1.051e-03 6.091e-04 1.725 0.085168 .
as.factor(company)14 3.398e-04 6.035e-04 0.563 0.573679
as.factor(company)15 8.905e-03 7.156e-04 12.444 < 2e-16 ***
as.factor(company)16 -7.267e-04 4.417e-04 -1.645 0.100535
as.factor(company)17 7.699e-04 8.542e-04 0.901 0.367795
as.factor(company)18 1.092e-04 6.237e-04 0.175 0.861097
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as.factor(company)19
as.factor(company)20
as.factor(company)21
as.factor(company)22
as.factor(company)23
as.factor(company)24
as.factor(company)25
as.factor(company)26
as.factor(company)27
as.factor(company)28
as.factor(company)29
as.factor(company)30
as.factor(company)32
as.factor(company)33
as.factor(company)34
as.factor(company)35
as.factor(company)36
as.factor(company)37
as.factor(company)38
as.factor(company)39
as.factor(company)40
as.factor(company)41
as.factor(company)42
as.factor(company)43
as.factor(company)44
as.factor(company)45
as.factor(company)46
as.factor(company)47
as.factor(company)48
as.factor(company)49
as.factor(company)50
as.factor(company)51
as.factor(company)52
as.factor(company)53
as.factor(company)54
as.factor(company)55
as.factor(company)56
as.factor(company)57
as.factor(company)59
as.factor(company)60
as.factor(company)61
as.factor(company)62
as.factor(company)63
as.factor(company)64
as.factor(company)65
as.factor(company)66
as.factor(company)67
as.factor(company)68
as.factor(company)69
as.factor(company)70

-1.880e-04
-7.157e-04
-2.008e-04
1.376e-04
1.302e-04
4.581e-05
-3.095e-04
-2.868e-04
1.179e-03
-2.635e-04
9.886e-04
-4.343e-04
3.404e-04
1.286e-03
4.997e-04
2.581e-03
-5.363e-04
-3.575e-05
-1.792e-04
-6.494e-04
-7.551e-04
-2.760e-04
-7.275e-04
1.631e-04
2.575e-05
9.329e-04
5.595e-04
-2.886e-04
2.155e-03
-3.053e-04
-3.541e-04
1.014e-03
-2.594e-04
-4.205e-04
8.579e-05
3.888e-03
2.922e-04
8.364e-04
-5.064e-04
1.312e-03
-8.372e-04
-6.587e-05
-2.311e-04
7.315e-04
-4.249e-04
-2.704e-04
-4.523e-04
1.681e-03
-4.828e-04
7.740e-03

6.011e-04
4.555e-04
5.977e-04
8.552e-04
6.547e-04
6.223e-04
8.740e-04
6.219e-04
6.145e-04
6.473e-04
6.073e-04
6.159e-04
6.110e-04
7.101e-04
6.078e-04
6.099e-04
8.588e-04
6.175e-04
5.985e-04
6.082e-04
7.364e-04
5.971e-04
7.381e-04
6.579e-04
6.413e-04
5.976e-04
8.508e-04
6.140e-04
6.080e-04
6.110e-04
6.358e-04
6.127e-04
4.641e-04
5.447e-04
7.075e-04
8.546e-04
6.206e-04
8.575e-04
7.046e-04
6.169e-04
6.051e-04
5.969e-04
6.114e-04
6.245e-04
6.418e-04
6.304e-04
8.519e-04
6.098e-04
6.128e-04
4.419e-04

-0.313 0.754618
-1.571 0.116708
-0.336 0.736998
0.161 0.872227
0.199 0.842410
0.074 0.941348
-0.354 0.723414
-0.461 0.644901
1.918 0.055606 .
-0.407 0.684116
1.628 0.104165
-0.705 0.480995
0.557 0.577654
1.812 0.070624 .
0.822 0.411358
4.232 2.74e-05 ***
-0.624 0.532596
-0.058 0.953852
-0.299 0.764738
-1.068 0.286179
-1.025 0.305660
-0.462 0.644079
-0.986 0.324722
0.248 0.804307
0.040 0.967987
1.561 0.119112
0.658 0.511093
-0.470 0.638511
3.544 0.000430 ***
-0.500 0.617508
-0.557 0.577805
1.655 0.098589 .
-0.559 0.576552
-0.772 0.440433
0.121 0.903533
4.550 6.68e-06 ***
0.471 0.637911
0.975 0.329807
-0.719 0.472661
2.126 0.033949 *
-1.384 0.167096
-0.110 0.912180
-0.378 0.705626
1.171 0.242019
-0.662 0.508260
-0.429 0.668138
-0.531 0.595711
2.757 0.006036 **
-0.788 0.431127
17.515 < 2e-16 ***
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as.factor(company)71 1.272e-03 7.512e-04 1.693 0.091052 .
as.factor(company)73 2.109e-04 7.610e-04 0.277 0.781777
as.factor(company)74 1.008e-03 5.994e-04 1.682 0.093164 .
as.factor(company)75 -3.638e-04 4.684e-04 -0.777 0.437674
as.factor(company)76 2.965e-03 6.305e-04 4.704 3.28e-06 ***
as.factor(company)77 -6.153e-04 5.370e-04 -1.146 0.252462
as.factor(company)78 -7.177e-04 4.579e-04 -1.567 0.117636
as.factor(company)79 2.534e-03 4.655e-04 5.443 8.11e-08 ***
as.factor(company)80 1.410e-03 6.118e-04 2.305 0.021558 *
as.factor(company)81 1.163e-05 6.081e-04 0.019 0.984753
as.factor(company)82 -1.824e-05 5.960e-04 -0.031 0.975598
as.factor(company)83 1.804e-04 6.134e-04 0.294 0.768876
as.factor(company)84 3.444e-04 6.142e-04 0.561 0.575282
as.factor(company)85 2.376e-03 6.053e-04 3.925 9.83e-05 ***
as.factor(company)86 -6.222e-04 7.174e-04 -0.867 0.386245
as.factor(company)87 1.610e-03 6.075e-04 2.650 0.008301 **
as.factor(company)88 -4.719e-04 6.066e-04 -0.778 0.436972
as.factor(company)89 5.445e-04 8.460e-04 0.644 0.520089
as.factor(company)90 1.760e-03 6.078e-04 2.895 0.003945 **
as.factor(company)91 -1.130e-04 8.554e-04 -0.132 0.894974
as.factor(company)92 -2.501e-04 6.036e-04 -0.414 0.678762
as.factor(company)93 1.919e-03 7.103e-04 2.702 0.007115 **
as.factor(company)94 5.046e-04 6.107e-04 0.826 0.409038
as.factor(company)95 1.890e-03 6.603e-04 2.862 0.004373 **
as.factor(company)96 -1.904e-04 6.127e-04 -0.311 0.756127
as.factor(company)97 7.836e-04 8.575e-04 0.914 0.361242
as.factor(company)98 -3.162e-04 6.083e-04 -0.520 0.603409
as.factor(company)99 -9.118e-04 4.416e-04 -2.064 0.039467 *
as.factor(company)100 -8.677e-04 4.458e-04 -1.947 0.052128 .
as.factor(company)101 -8.862e-04 4.452e-04 -1.991 0.047053 *
as.factor(company)102 4.064e-04 5.233e-04 0.777 0.437776
as.factor(company)103 -1.758e-04 6.266e-04 -0.281 0.779113
as.factor(company)104 -6.239e-04 6.989e-04 -0.893 0.372425
as.factor(company)105 -3.015e-05 6.039e-04 -0.050 0.960193
as.factor(company)106 1.017e-05 6.568e-04 0.015 0.987658
as.factor(company)107 5.486e-04 6.171e-04 0.889 0.374397
as.factor(company)108 -6.715e-04 7.378e-04 -0.910 0.363186
as.factor(company)109 1.408e-04 6.539e-04 0.215 0.829592
as.factor(company)110 -4.352e-04 8.549e-04 -0.509 0.610898
as.factor(company)111 -3.742e-05 5.960e-04 -0.063 0.949969
as.factor(company)112 -2.337e-04 7.000e-04 -0.334 0.738637
as.factor(company)113 -2.958e-04 6.060e-04 -0.488 0.625655
as.factor(company)114 2.999e-03 6.094e-04 4.922 1.15e-06 ***
as.factor(company)115 -6.610e-04 8.522e-04 -0.776 0.438289
as.factor(company)116 5.588e-03 8.711e-04 6.414 3.18e-10 ***
as.factor(company)117 -8.903e-04 4.437e-04 -2.006 0.045338 *
as.factor(company)118 8.159e-04 8.442e-04 0.966 0.334281
as.factor(company)119 4.648e-04 7.106e-04 0.654 0.513374
as.factor(company)120 -5.997e-05 5.984e-04 -0.100 0.920219
as.factor(company)121 -3.636e-04 5.942e-04 -0.612 0.540898
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as.factor(company)122
as.factor(company)123
as.factor(company)124
as.factor(company)125
as.factor(company)126
as.factor(company)127
as.factor(company)128
as.factor(company)129
as.factor(company)130
as.factor(company)131
as.factor(company)132
as.factor(company)134
as.factor(company)135
as.factor(company)136
as.factor(company)137
as.factor(company)138
as.factor(company)139
as.factor(company)140
as.factor(company)141
as.factor(company)142
as.factor(company)143
as.factor(company)144
as.factor(company)145
as.factor(company)146
as.factor(company)147
as.factor(company)153
as.factor(company)154
as.factor(company)155
as.factor(company)156
as.factor(company)157
as.factor(company)158
as.factor(company)159
as.factor(company)160
as.factor(company)161
as.factor(company)162
as.factor(company)163
as.factor(company)164
as.factor(company)165
as.factor(company)166
as.factor(company)167
as.factor(company)168
as.factor(company)169
as.factor(company)170
as.factor(company)171
as.factor(company)172
as.factor(company)173
as.factor(company)174
as.factor(company)175
as.factor(company)176
as.factor(company)178

2.883e-04
-2.131e-04
-7.301e-04
6.173e-05
-9.923e-04
-4.064e-04
4.594e-04
-7.008e-04
9.116e-04
1.334e-03
2.148e-04
3.344e-04
-9.200e-04
-1.222e-04
6.111e-02
-1.351e-04
-9.230e-05
-1.348e-04
3.612e-03
-7.588e-04
-6.810e-04
-1.553e-04
-8.732e-05
-5.322e-04
1.838e-03
-3.508e-04
-2.835e-04
1.034e-03
1.619e-03
1.074e-03
4.630e-05
4.300e-04
-4.925e-04
8.853e-04
1.971e-03
1.339e-03
-1.786e-04
-8.980e-04
1.816e-04
1.090e-05
-7.488e-04
1.113e-03
3.949e-04
6.654e-05
1.084e-03
-3.895e-04
-3.317e-04
-8.437e-04
-2.011e-06
-1.708e-04

5.967e-04 0.483 0.629175
5.988e-04 -0.356 0.722027
7.450e-04 -0.980 0.327547
1.348e-03 0.046 0.963482
6.194e-04 -1.602 0.109727
8.669e-04 -0.469 0.639361
4.277e-04 1.074 0.283299
4.941e-04 -1.418 0.156679
1.330e-03 0.685 0.493370
6.166e-04 2.164 0.030895 *
5.959e-04 0.360 0.718688
6.247e-04 0.535 0.592593
5.902e-04 -1.559 0.119667
6.534e-04 -0.187 0.851719
6.077e-04 100.564 < 2e-16 ***
6.140e-04 -0.220 0.825993
4.389e-04 -0.210 0.833523
6.186e-04 -0.218 0.827617
7.108e-04 5.082 5.23e-07 ***
4.483e-04 -1.693 0.091136 .
6.100e-04 -1.116 0.264752
6.115e-04 -0.254 0.799625
8.563e-04 -0.102 0.918823
4.305e-04 -1.236 0.216977
6.832e-04 2.690 0.007381 **
5.989e-04 -0.586 0.558283
7.137e-04 -0.397 0.691375
5.978e-04 1.730 0.084201 .
6.582e-04 2.460 0.014214 *
5.981e-04 1.796 0.073030 .
6.079e-04 0.076 0.939319
6.128e-04 0.702 0.483169
7.233e-04 -0.681 0.496265
6.283e-04 1.409 0.159391
5.981e-04 3.296 0.001049 **
1.351e-03 0.992 0.321891
5.927e-04 -0.301 0.763342
4.337e-04 -2.071 0.038877 *
6.975e-04 0.260 0.794722
4.482e-04 0.024 0.980612
5.244e-04 -1.428 0.153896
6.307e-04 1.766 0.078052 .
6.007e-04 0.657 0.511188
6.058e-04 0.110 0.912583
8.461e-04 1.281 0.200729
5.991e-04 -0.650 0.515879
8.418e-04 -0.394 0.693701
7.351e-04 -1.148 0.251592
5.911e-04 -0.003 0.997287
6.010e-04 -0.284 0.776368
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as.factor(company)179 2.072e-04 6.588e-04 0.314 0.753303
as.factor(company)180 1.708e-04 6.232e-04 0.274 0.784200
as.factor(company)181 -3.230e-04 5.904e-04 -0.547 0.584482
as.factor(company)182 -7.514e-04 6.967e-04 -1.078 0.281326
as.factor(company)183 -2.072e-04 6.254e-04 -0.331 0.740526
as.factor(company)184 2.891e-04 6.307e-04 0.458 0.646834
as.factor(company)185 8.522e-04 6.131e-04 1.390 0.165149
as.factor(company)186 5.084e-04 5.983e-04 0.850 0.395860
as.factor(company)187 -2.312e-04 6.991e-04 -0.331 0.741043
as.factor(company)188 4.003e-04 6.093e-04 0.657 0.511488
as.factor(company)189 -1.035e-04 5.946e-04 -0.174 0.861876
as.factor(company)190 3.679e-04 7.011e-04 0.525 0.599955
as.factor(company)191 -1.373e-04 6.606e-04 -0.208 0.835495
as.factor(company)192 -1.007e-03 4.908e-04 -2.051 0.040809 *
as.factor(company)193 -9.835e-05 8.430e-04 -0.117 0.907171
as.factor(company)194 -4.426e-04 5.960e-04 -0.743 0.458065
as.factor(company)195 -8.037e-04 4.908e-04 -1.638 0.102128
as.factor(company)196 -4.534e-04 6.112e-04 -0.742 0.458515
as.factor(company)197 -4.838e-05 8.615e-04 -0.056 0.955239
as.factor(company)199 1.341e-03 6.109e-04 2.196 0.028533 *
as.numeric(nib)
-5.514e-05 5.405e-05 -1.020 0.308141
as.numeric(nbmeeting) -7.041e-07 1.609e-05 -0.044 0.965122
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.0006681 on 520 degrees of freedom
(29 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.9883,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9839
F-statistic: 225 on 195 and 520 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Appendix 8: Tobin’s Q output with time effect
The following output shows the results for Tobin`s Q with taking time into
consideration
Call:
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.factor(company) + as.factor(Year) +
as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting), data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q
Max
-0.0070201 -0.0001222 0.0000000 0.0001178 0.0091037
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
1.028e-03 1.371e-03 0.750 0.453637
as.numeric(Audit) -8.391e-05 1.020e-03 -0.082 0.934488
as.numeric(board_size) 3.087e-05 4.701e-05 0.657 0.511650
as.factor(industry)1 4.344e-05 4.053e-04 0.107 0.914679
as.numeric(leverage) -2.320e-07 2.009e-07 -1.155 0.248814
as.numeric(nbcom) -5.579e-05 8.903e-05 -0.627 0.531210
as.numeric(employees) 8.656e-08 2.484e-07 0.349 0.727593
as.factor(company)2 5.422e-05 7.345e-04 0.074 0.941181
as.factor(company)3 3.871e-04 4.309e-04 0.898 0.369494
as.factor(company)4 9.922e-04 6.110e-04 1.624 0.105032
as.factor(company)5 -1.681e-04 4.542e-04 -0.370 0.711505
as.factor(company)6 -8.303e-05 6.326e-04 -0.131 0.895620
as.factor(company)7 -6.572e-04 5.632e-04 -1.167 0.243799
as.factor(company)8 -3.224e-04 6.014e-04 -0.536 0.592157
as.factor(company)9 3.951e-05 5.913e-04 0.067 0.946756
as.factor(company)10 6.497e-03 6.474e-04 10.036 < 2e-16 ***
as.factor(company)11 2.250e-03 5.761e-04 3.906 0.000106 ***
as.factor(company)12 3.070e-04 6.002e-04 0.511 0.609287
as.factor(company)13 1.038e-03 6.018e-04 1.725 0.085122 .
as.factor(company)14 4.031e-04 5.964e-04 0.676 0.499459
as.factor(company)15 9.006e-03 7.084e-04 12.713 < 2e-16 ***
as.factor(company)16 -7.497e-04 4.363e-04 -1.718 0.086343 .
as.factor(company)17 9.058e-04 8.460e-04 1.071 0.284784
as.factor(company)18 1.327e-04 6.178e-04 0.215 0.830019
as.factor(company)19 -1.448e-04 5.939e-04 -0.244 0.807520
as.factor(company)20 -7.351e-04 4.499e-04 -1.634 0.102888
as.factor(company)21 -1.985e-04 5.904e-04 -0.336 0.736919
as.factor(company)22 2.994e-04 8.465e-04 0.354 0.723710
as.factor(company)23 1.676e-04 6.466e-04 0.259 0.795561
as.factor(company)24 1.310e-04 6.155e-04 0.213 0.831489
as.factor(company)25 -4.895e-04 8.679e-04 -0.564 0.572998
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as.factor(company)26
as.factor(company)27
as.factor(company)28
as.factor(company)29
as.factor(company)30
as.factor(company)32
as.factor(company)33
as.factor(company)34
as.factor(company)35
as.factor(company)36
as.factor(company)37
as.factor(company)38
as.factor(company)39
as.factor(company)40
as.factor(company)41
as.factor(company)42
as.factor(company)43
as.factor(company)44
as.factor(company)45
as.factor(company)46
as.factor(company)47
as.factor(company)48
as.factor(company)49
as.factor(company)50
as.factor(company)51
as.factor(company)52
as.factor(company)53
as.factor(company)54
as.factor(company)55
as.factor(company)56
as.factor(company)57
as.factor(company)59
as.factor(company)60
as.factor(company)61
as.factor(company)62
as.factor(company)63
as.factor(company)64
as.factor(company)65
as.factor(company)66
as.factor(company)67
as.factor(company)68
as.factor(company)69
as.factor(company)70
as.factor(company)71
as.factor(company)73
as.factor(company)74
as.factor(company)75
as.factor(company)76
as.factor(company)77
as.factor(company)78

-2.694e-04
1.141e-03
-2.402e-04
1.081e-03
-3.473e-04
3.225e-04
1.327e-03
5.088e-04
2.657e-03
-5.447e-04
1.512e-05
-1.247e-04
-5.642e-04
-6.951e-04
-2.514e-04
-9.141e-04
8.222e-05
1.228e-04
9.933e-04
7.134e-04
-1.916e-04
2.182e-03
-2.582e-04
-2.935e-04
1.075e-03
-3.854e-04
-3.560e-04
-1.968e-05
3.998e-03
3.299e-04
8.410e-04
-4.784e-04
1.365e-03
-7.305e-04
-2.083e-05
-2.156e-04
8.639e-04
-4.152e-04
-2.423e-04
-3.733e-04
1.761e-03
-4.301e-04
7.773e-03
1.157e-03
1.039e-04
1.066e-03
-2.907e-04
2.997e-03
-5.398e-04
-7.140e-04

6.160e-04
6.083e-04
6.404e-04
6.006e-04
6.089e-04
6.043e-04
7.014e-04
6.005e-04
6.028e-04
8.490e-04
6.112e-04
5.915e-04
6.019e-04
7.290e-04
5.899e-04
7.308e-04
6.503e-04
6.352e-04
5.905e-04
8.429e-04
6.071e-04
6.007e-04
6.037e-04
6.294e-04
6.057e-04
4.594e-04
5.420e-04
6.999e-04
8.451e-04
6.137e-04
8.469e-04
6.965e-04
6.099e-04
5.986e-04
5.902e-04
6.048e-04
6.185e-04
6.337e-04
6.228e-04
8.429e-04
6.027e-04
6.059e-04
4.363e-04
7.423e-04
7.523e-04
5.922e-04
4.635e-04
6.227e-04
5.328e-04
4.522e-04

-0.437 0.662034
1.875 0.061294 .
-0.375 0.707796
1.799 0.072539 .
-0.570 0.568701
0.534 0.593798
1.893 0.058979 .
0.847 0.397279
4.408 1.27e-05 ***
-0.642 0.521409
0.025 0.980269
-0.211 0.833131
-0.937 0.348969
-0.954 0.340731
-0.426 0.670120
-1.251 0.211543
0.126 0.899445
0.193 0.846835
1.682 0.093160 .
0.846 0.397734
-0.316 0.752480
3.633 0.000308 ***
-0.428 0.668990
-0.466 0.641116
1.775 0.076474 .
-0.839 0.401867
-0.657 0.511553
-0.028 0.977580
4.731 2.89e-06 ***
0.538 0.591099
0.993 0.321172
-0.687 0.492498
2.238 0.025648 *
-1.220 0.222848
-0.035 0.971859
-0.356 0.721669
1.397 0.163048
-0.655 0.512605
-0.389 0.697446
-0.443 0.658015
2.922 0.003626 **
-0.710 0.478140
17.817 < 2e-16 ***
1.558 0.119800
0.138 0.890226
1.801 0.072301 .
-0.627 0.530884
4.813 1.96e-06 ***
-1.013 0.311415
-1.579 0.114944
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as.factor(company)79 2.472e-03 4.598e-04 5.377 1.15e-07 ***
as.factor(company)80 1.425e-03 6.045e-04 2.358 0.018737 *
as.factor(company)81 7.662e-05 6.010e-04 0.128 0.898591
as.factor(company)82 1.951e-05 5.898e-04 0.033 0.973625
as.factor(company)83 2.388e-04 6.060e-04 0.394 0.693651
as.factor(company)84 3.550e-04 6.076e-04 0.584 0.559318
as.factor(company)85 2.445e-03 5.983e-04 4.086 5.09e-05 ***
as.factor(company)86 -6.238e-04 7.104e-04 -0.878 0.380250
as.factor(company)87 1.667e-03 6.002e-04 2.778 0.005675 **
as.factor(company)88 -3.850e-04 5.998e-04 -0.642 0.521207
as.factor(company)89 6.390e-04 8.385e-04 0.762 0.446399
as.factor(company)90 1.764e-03 6.004e-04 2.939 0.003439 **
as.factor(company)91 5.375e-05 8.467e-04 0.063 0.949412
as.factor(company)92 -2.212e-04 5.970e-04 -0.370 0.711165
as.factor(company)93 1.975e-03 7.023e-04 2.813 0.005102 **
as.factor(company)94 5.733e-04 6.036e-04 0.950 0.342650
as.factor(company)95 1.905e-03 6.531e-04 2.917 0.003694 **
as.factor(company)96 -1.389e-04 6.054e-04 -0.229 0.818599
as.factor(company)97 8.936e-04 8.496e-04 1.052 0.293335
as.factor(company)98 -2.703e-04 6.010e-04 -0.450 0.653050
as.factor(company)99 -8.433e-04 4.367e-04 -1.931 0.054031 .
as.factor(company)100 -8.036e-04 4.403e-04 -1.825 0.068573 .
as.factor(company)101 -8.300e-04 4.399e-04 -1.887 0.059746 .
as.factor(company)102 4.591e-04 5.177e-04 0.887 0.375542
as.factor(company)103 -7.535e-05 6.202e-04 -0.121 0.903345
as.factor(company)104 -4.968e-04 6.913e-04 -0.719 0.472704
as.factor(company)105 -1.291e-05 5.967e-04 -0.022 0.982750
as.factor(company)106 1.628e-05 6.490e-04 0.025 0.980001
as.factor(company)107 5.511e-04 6.101e-04 0.903 0.366779
as.factor(company)108 -5.932e-04 7.297e-04 -0.813 0.416600
as.factor(company)109 1.739e-04 6.468e-04 0.269 0.788075
as.factor(company)110 -3.544e-04 8.463e-04 -0.419 0.675543
as.factor(company)111 -9.484e-06 5.889e-04 -0.016 0.987156
as.factor(company)112 -3.539e-04 6.931e-04 -0.511 0.609897
as.factor(company)113 -3.041e-04 5.988e-04 -0.508 0.611838
as.factor(company)114 3.020e-03 6.025e-04 5.013 7.36e-07 ***
as.factor(company)115 -5.187e-04 8.448e-04 -0.614 0.539517
as.factor(company)116 5.422e-03 8.639e-04 6.277 7.33e-10 ***
as.factor(company)117 -8.438e-04 4.388e-04 -1.923 0.055060 .
as.factor(company)118 8.452e-04 8.355e-04 1.012 0.312170
as.factor(company)119 5.197e-04 7.034e-04 0.739 0.460322
as.factor(company)120 1.954e-07 5.915e-04 0.000 0.999736
as.factor(company)121 -3.889e-04 5.871e-04 -0.663 0.507940
as.factor(company)122 3.154e-04 5.896e-04 0.535 0.592859
as.factor(company)123 -1.957e-04 5.916e-04 -0.331 0.740942
as.factor(company)124 -6.256e-04 7.371e-04 -0.849 0.396453
as.factor(company)125 8.786e-05 1.332e-03 0.066 0.947441
as.factor(company)126 -9.426e-04 6.126e-04 -1.539 0.124504
as.factor(company)127 -2.230e-04 8.571e-04 -0.260 0.794834
as.factor(company)128 4.416e-04 4.226e-04 1.045 0.296507
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as.factor(company)129
as.factor(company)130
as.factor(company)131
as.factor(company)132
as.factor(company)134
as.factor(company)135
as.factor(company)136
as.factor(company)137
as.factor(company)138
as.factor(company)139
as.factor(company)140
as.factor(company)141
as.factor(company)142
as.factor(company)143
as.factor(company)144
as.factor(company)145
as.factor(company)146
as.factor(company)147
as.factor(company)153
as.factor(company)154
as.factor(company)155
as.factor(company)156
as.factor(company)157
as.factor(company)158
as.factor(company)159
as.factor(company)160
as.factor(company)161
as.factor(company)162
as.factor(company)163
as.factor(company)164
as.factor(company)165
as.factor(company)166
as.factor(company)167
as.factor(company)168
as.factor(company)169
as.factor(company)170
as.factor(company)171
as.factor(company)172
as.factor(company)173
as.factor(company)174
as.factor(company)175
as.factor(company)176
as.factor(company)178
as.factor(company)179
as.factor(company)180
as.factor(company)181
as.factor(company)182
as.factor(company)183
as.factor(company)184
as.factor(company)185

-6.614e-04
9.804e-04
1.434e-03
2.481e-04
3.156e-04
-9.533e-04
-1.630e-04
6.113e-02
-8.176e-05
-2.215e-06
-8.309e-05
3.574e-03
-7.853e-04
-6.148e-04
-2.188e-04
3.360e-05
-5.722e-04
1.924e-03
-2.756e-04
-1.116e-04
1.090e-03
1.691e-03
1.070e-03
6.191e-05
4.030e-04
-2.955e-04
9.004e-04
2.024e-03
1.308e-03
-1.505e-04
-8.750e-04
1.764e-04
-1.778e-05
-6.565e-04
1.154e-03
4.564e-04
9.702e-05
1.203e-03
-3.532e-04
-5.145e-04
-7.311e-04
-2.437e-05
-1.572e-04
3.132e-04
2.311e-04
-3.066e-04
-7.833e-04
-1.248e-04
2.834e-04
8.792e-04

4.917e-04 -1.345 0.179140
1.317e-03 0.744 0.457101
6.099e-04 2.352 0.019070 *
5.893e-04 0.421 0.673939
6.172e-04 0.511 0.609315
5.830e-04 -1.635 0.102630
6.454e-04 -0.253 0.800670
6.003e-04 101.831 < 2e-16 ***
6.070e-04 -0.135 0.892905
4.349e-04 -0.005 0.995939
6.113e-04 -0.136 0.891933
7.027e-04 5.086 5.12e-07 ***
4.429e-04 -1.773 0.076825 .
6.030e-04 -1.020 0.308378
6.043e-04 -0.362 0.717496
8.481e-04 0.040 0.968415
4.251e-04 -1.346 0.178906
6.765e-04 2.844 0.004627 **
5.917e-04 -0.466 0.641521
7.074e-04 -0.158 0.874741
5.911e-04 1.843 0.065844 .
6.506e-04 2.599 0.009606 **
5.913e-04 1.809 0.070955 .
6.006e-04 0.103 0.917931
6.054e-04 0.666 0.505872
7.166e-04 -0.412 0.680230
6.204e-04 1.451 0.147299
5.911e-04 3.424 0.000666 ***
1.337e-03 0.978 0.328343
5.861e-04 -0.257 0.797426
4.287e-04 -2.041 0.041748 *
6.905e-04 0.255 0.798516
4.427e-04 -0.040 0.967971
5.186e-04 -1.266 0.206120
6.231e-04 1.852 0.064533 .
5.939e-04 0.768 0.442570
5.985e-04 0.162 0.871284
8.382e-04 1.436 0.151660
5.922e-04 -0.596 0.551111
8.337e-04 -0.617 0.537411
7.275e-04 -1.005 0.315435
5.840e-04 -0.042 0.966729
5.940e-04 -0.265 0.791396
6.510e-04 0.481 0.630593
6.170e-04 0.375 0.708141
5.834e-04 -0.526 0.599421
6.900e-04 -1.135 0.256832
6.183e-04 -0.202 0.840079
6.231e-04 0.455 0.649429
6.063e-04 1.450 0.147656
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as.factor(company)186 4.601e-04 5.912e-04 0.778 0.436819
as.factor(company)187 -2.628e-04 6.903e-04 -0.381 0.703618
as.factor(company)188 4.750e-04 6.022e-04 0.789 0.430553
as.factor(company)189 -6.961e-05 5.875e-04 -0.118 0.905723
as.factor(company)190 4.324e-04 6.945e-04 0.623 0.533793
as.factor(company)191 -3.344e-05 6.540e-04 -0.051 0.959239
as.factor(company)192 -8.767e-04 4.863e-04 -1.803 0.072006 .
as.factor(company)193 4.287e-05 8.342e-04 0.051 0.959038
as.factor(company)194 -4.267e-04 5.890e-04 -0.724 0.469107
as.factor(company)195 -7.228e-04 4.861e-04 -1.487 0.137640
as.factor(company)196 -4.088e-04 6.042e-04 -0.677 0.498962
as.factor(company)197 7.504e-05 8.520e-04 0.088 0.929853
as.factor(company)199 1.352e-03 6.035e-04 2.241 0.025436 *
as.factor(Year)2014 2.631e-04 8.500e-05 3.095 0.002072 **
as.factor(Year)2015 1.476e-04 8.749e-05 1.687 0.092258 .
as.factor(Year)2016 -8.358e-06 8.976e-05 -0.093 0.925847
as.factor(Year)2017 -2.215e-05 8.717e-05 -0.254 0.799559
as.numeric(nib)
-5.205e-05 5.553e-05 -0.937 0.349034
as.numeric(nbmeeting) 1.378e-05 1.708e-05 0.807 0.419889
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.0006594 on 516 degrees of freedom
(29 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.9887,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9843
F-statistic: 226.4 on 199 and 516 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Appendix 9: Tobin’s Q OLS output
The following output ignored both time and companies’ effect with Tobin`s Q.

Call:
lm(formula = TobinQ ~ +as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),
data = mydata)
Residuals:
Min
1Q Median
3Q
Max
-0.003914 -0.001401 -0.000463 0.000433 0.067314
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
6.293e-03 1.840e-03 3.420 0.000662 ***
as.numeric(Audit)
9.594e-04 1.512e-03 0.634 0.526002
as.numeric(board_size) -1.797e-04 1.608e-04 -1.118 0.263959
as.factor(industry)1 -4.429e-04 5.316e-04 -0.833 0.405046
as.numeric(leverage) -4.881e-06 9.563e-07 -5.104 4.27e-07 ***
as.numeric(nbcom) -8.239e-04 2.621e-04 -3.144 0.001737 **
as.numeric(employees) 1.365e-06 9.247e-07 1.476 0.140423
as.numeric(nib)
5.035e-05 1.845e-04 0.273 0.785069
as.numeric(nbmeeting) 3.065e-05 7.801e-05 0.393 0.694512
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.005117 on 707 degrees of freedom
(29 observations deleted due to missingness)
Multiple R-squared: 0.06586,
Adjusted R-squared: 0.05529
F-statistic: 6.231 on 8 and 707 DF, p-value: 8.4e-08
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Appendix 10: Tobin’s Q fixed model
This is the fixed model that takes companies’ effect as factors.

fixed <plm(TobinQ~as.numeric(Audit)+(as.numeric(board_size))+as.factor(industry)+as.nu
meric(leverage)+as.numeric(nbcom)+as.numeric(employees)+as.numeric(nib)+as.nu
meric(nbmeeting), index=c("company"),data=mydata,model="between")
summary(fixed)
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model
Call:
plm(formula = TobinQ ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) +
as.factor(industry) + as.numeric(leverage) + as.numeric(nbcom) +
as.numeric(employees) + as.numeric(nib) + as.numeric(nbmeeting),
data = mydata, model = "between", index = c("company"))
Unbalanced Panel: n = 188, T = 1-5, N = 716
Observations used in estimation: 188
Residuals:
Min. 1st Qu.
Median 3rd Qu.
Max.
-0.00321954 -0.00134079 -0.00034736 0.00050149 0.05775967
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
6.1709e-03 3.3011e-03 1.8693 0.063212 .
as.numeric(Audit)
4.9796e-04 2.5953e-03 0.1919 0.848060
as.numeric(board_size) -1.5570e-04 3.0414e-04 -0.5119 0.609330
as.factor(industry)1 -6.7251e-04 9.0663e-04 -0.7418 0.459200
as.numeric(leverage) -5.8296e-06 1.9640e-06 -2.9682 0.003405 **
as.numeric(nbcom) -9.2654e-04 5.1444e-04 -1.8011 0.073377 .
as.numeric(employees) 2.0074e-06 1.7668e-06 1.1362 0.257400
as.numeric(nib)
8.3892e-05 3.6113e-04 0.2323 0.816566
as.numeric(nbmeeting) 9.0999e-05 1.7099e-04 0.5322 0.595259
--Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares: 0.0040475
Residual Sum of Squares: 0.0037148
R-Squared:
0.082192
Adj. R-Squared: 0.041173
F-statistic: 2.00374 on 8 and 179 DF, p-value: 0.04837
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Appendix 11: Tobin’s Q f-test
This is F test to show which model is better (fixed model or ordinary least square
method).
F test for individual effects
data: TobinQ ~ as.numeric(Audit) + (as.numeric(board_size)) + as.factor(industry) +
...
F = 1.3501, df1 = 528, df2 = 179, p-value = 0.008902
alternative hypothesis: significant effects
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